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ABSTRACT: Critical Race Theory was founded as “a race-based, systematic critique of legal
reasoning and legal institutions….” Critics argue that it struggles to define its substantive
mission, methodological commitments, and connection to the world outside of academia. This
article attempts to provide a specific methodology—empirical social science—that is consistent
with Critical Race Theory’s overarching mission and that has both applied and academic
components. This methodology should ultimately 1) expose racism where it may be found, 2)
identify its effects on individuals and institutions, and 3) put forth a concerted attack against it,
in part, via public policy arguments. This concept, Critical Race Realism, is drawn from a long
and rich intellectual history. I explore this history as it started with the growth of
interdisciplinarity in American legal education and traversed its way through intellectual
movements at Columbia, Yale, Chicago, and Wisconsin law schools. I then look at the recent
explosion in empirical legal scholarship and the New Legal Realism Project as contemporary
efforts with which Critical Race Realism must square itself. I then systematically explore the
growth of social science, race, and law scholarship as well as race and empirical legal
scholarship over the past twenty years. I close by reconciling Critical Race Theory with this
intellectual history and these contemporary movements and suggest ways in which Critical Race
Realism might be developed.
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Like men we'll face the murderous, cowardly pack,
Pressed to the wall, dying, but fighting back!
--Claude McKay1
INTRODUCTION
A historical account of American law shows a dramatic irony; the law has served as a
tool to both oppress and liberate African Americans.2 In the face of such oppression, a handful of
lawyers3 and law professors4 have used the law for progressive, social change. Among the latter,
Critical Race Theorists have been in the vanguard of providing “a race-based, systematic critique
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of legal reasoning and legal institutions….”5 In 2002, Temple University Press published
Crossroads, Directions, and a New Critical Race Theory.6 The volume is comprised largely of
papers and speeches presented in 1997 at the Critical Race Theory Conference held at Yale Law
School, a commemoration of Critical Race Theory’s tenth anniversary.7 In one of the
commentaries on the book,8 Rachel Moran noted that it captures a discipline at a crossroads,
struggling to define its substantive mission, methodological commitments, and connection to the
world outside of academia.9 Almost ten years after the Yale conference and four years after
Crossroads’ publication, Critical Race Theory continues to grapple with these same issues.
Thus, this article sets forth a particular methodology called Critical Race Realism.10
Critical Race Realism is a synthesis of Critical Race Theory, empirical social science, and public
policy.11 This methodology has both academic and applied components. Furthermore, its mission
is to provide a systematic, race-based evaluation and critique of legal doctrine, institutions, as
well as actors (e.g., judges, juries, etc.). By employing social science Critical Race Realism
5
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should 1) expose racism where it may be found, 2) identify its effects on individuals and
institutions, and 3) put forth a concerted attack against it, in part, via public policy arguments.
Section I of this article provides a backdrop to understand Critical Race Realism. It explores the
histories of the various actors who and movements that inform our understanding of Critical
Race Realism. Section II defines Critical Race Realism by example and elaboration on those
elements that comprise it.
I. CRITICAL RACE REALISM: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF CONSTITUENT FEATURES
There are a number of individuals and movements that inform us as to what Critical Race
Realism is or could be. This section highlights those movements and individuals. Subsection A
explores how early American legal education came to tolerate interdisciplinary study. Subsection
B highlights the contributions of Supreme Court Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo and
Harvard Law School dean Pound towards 1) the acceptance of social science within American
jurisprudence, 2) the study of law in action, and 3) the use of law to advance public policy.
Subsection C explores the work of academics at both Columbia and Yale Law Schools and their
efforts toward extending a new way of looking at the law—one that 1) is functional its approach,
2) debunks commonly held legal ideologies, and 3) integrates social science with the law, and
law with public policy. Subsection D investigates the development of the law “and” movement
and its progeny and how they too extended our understanding of 1) law and social science and 2)
critiques of legal doctrine, institutions, and actors.
A. INTERDISCIPLINARITY IN EARLY AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION
Since its inception in the early 1700s, American legal education has evolved
considerably; one such evolution is its interdisciplinary growth. At its beginning, there were two
avenues to joining the bar. Young “men” could go to England and acquire legal training at the
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Inns of Court,12 or they could read law in the office of an established practitioner.13 This latter
model, ultimately the more popular, consisted of both an apprenticeship coupled with a formal
examination.14 These apprenticeships gave birth to early, freestanding American law schools.15
The oldest, largest, and most influential was Connecticut’s Litchfield Law School, founded in
1784.16 By the early 1820s, many such proprietary law schools merged with local, established
colleges. These mergers gave private law schools prestige and the ability to grant degrees and
quite possibly provided colleges with greater influence among local lawyers, the powerful elite.17
Thirty years later, such institutionalized Eastern law schools as those at Columbia University,
New York University, and the University of Pennsylvania were founded.18
Harvard is credited with establishing the first modern, American law school.19 From 1870
to 1895, Christopher Columbus Langdell served as its dean.20 During his deanship, Harvard Law
School shaped the early “structure and content” of other American law schools.21 Langdell
shifted legal education from the undergraduate level to an eighteen-month, and then three-year,
post-baccalaureate degree program.22 He also hired the first career law professor,23 instituted
rigorous examinations and the college-degree requirement for admission,24 and developed a
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23
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24
Id.
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system of teaching that focused on appellate case analysis25 and Socratic questioning.26 In 1873,
James Barr Ames was appointed assistant professor of law at Harvard Law School, and it was
Ames who turned the case method into “a faith.”27 By then, Harvard’s curriculum was largely
professionally oriented, based on its 1852 curriculum and adapted during Langdell’s time.28
Harvard’s size and influence had a tremendous impact on other university-affiliated law
schools.29 As such, many law schools emulated Harvard’s academic approach, and those that did
not found it difficult to resist.30
Few law schools deviated from Harvard’s approach. Nonetheless, the entire legal
academic world during the late 1800s was not of one accord. Some believed that the law was
insufficient in and of itself to answer legal questions and reached beyond the confines of the law
to answer those questions. For example, in 1869, Yale law students were permitted to enroll in
other departmental courses such as political science, economics, English history, and ethics.31
Yale Law School, from 1874 onward, attempted to develop a broad curriculum, which included
courses with an interdisciplinary flavor.32 During the 1880s, the American Bar Association
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29
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and Blackstone and Kent were dropped.
30
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REED, supra note 28, at 302-303. Specifically, it offered such first-year courses as History of American Law,
General Jurisprudence and Common Law, Medical Jurisprudence, and Methods of Study and Mental Discipline.
26

6

indicated that legal curriculum needed more social science.33 At its founding in the late 1800s,
Cornell Law School encouraged its students to take courses in the School of History and Political
Science.34 In the 1890s, Catholic University Law School was housed within the School of Social
Sciences.35 Columbian (George Washington) University’s President referred to Columbian Law
School as the Columbian School of Comparative Jurisprudence.36 And Georgetown Law School
offered such interdisciplinary courses as legal ethics, legal philosophy, and legal history.37
American legal education continues to resemble the model set forth by Langdell and
extended by Ames at Harvard Law School between 1870 and 1910.38 However, significant
strides were made in developing a curriculum that reached outside of the law. More than simply
being interdisciplinary, social science became a growing part of legal education. Though its
presence has ebbed and flowed over the decades, its influence is again on the rise.
B. HOLMES, BRANDEIS, CARDOZO AND POUND
Law schools, in the abstract, were not the only ones expanding the conceptual bounds of
the law. Four men at the turn of the twentieth century advanced the idea that law is more than
what is in books, argued for broader conceptions of law’s utility, and that extra-legal factors
enhance our understanding of the law. These men were U.S. Supreme Court Justices Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., Louis Brandeis, and Benjamin Cardozo as well as former Harvard Law
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social science in the law school curriculum, to prepare the lawyer for his roles as lawyer, party leader, diplomat,
director of finance or education, judge, legislator, and statesman.”
34
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(1970).
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ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD: THE HISTORY OF IDEAS AND MEN, 1817-1967 (1967). The
deanships of Langdell (1870-1895) and Ames (1895-1910) spanned forty years.
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School dean Roscoe Pound.39 Each man served as a harbinger of Legal Realism, an area of
jurisprudence which dominated the mid-twentieth century.40
Like the Realists who followed, Holmes highlighted the real world aspect of the law
when he noted that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.”41 He also
highlighted that extra-legal factors had tremendous bearing on the law. Whether it was “[t]he felt
necessities of time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed
or unconscious, [or] the prejudices which judges share with their fellow men,” law was at least in
part governed by factors that fell outside the law.42 As such, Holmes did not simply contend that
social science was important in order to understand the law43 but also contended that whereas the
black-letter study of law is the present, “the man of the future is the man of statistics and the
master of economics.”44 In saying this, Holmes articulated a vision of what the law and legal
profession was to, or should, become.45
Brandeis’ contribution to the Realists was methodological, as he was the first lawyer to
employ social science data as part of a litigation strategy and towards defending a social policy
against constitutional attack.46 In his Muller v. Oregon brief, Brandeis utilized statistical support

39

See GARY JAN AICHELE, LEGAL REALISM AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE: THE CHANGING
CONSENSUS, 13-25, 30-43 (1990); ROBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY
22-37 (1982). Summers places Holmes and Pound among the founders of Pragmatic Instrumentalism—a variant of
Legal Realism; Robbin E. Smith, William O. Douglas and American Legal Realism Continuity Through Change 5380 (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University) (on file with Proquest).
40
See AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 3 (William W. Fisher III, Morton J. Horowitz, & Thomas A. Reed eds., 1993).
See also WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 22-23 (1973); Smith, William O.
Douglas, supra note XX, at 53-82.
41
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
42
See id. at 1.
43
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Profession of the Law, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES:
COMPLETE PUBLIC WRITINGS AND SELECTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF O LIVER WENDELL HOLMES 471, 472 (Sheldon
M. Novick ed., 1995).
44
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167 (1920).
45
JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 270 (1930). Frank, one of the Realists, stated of Holmes,
“[W]hatever clear vision of legal realities we have attained in this country in the past twenty five years is in large
measure due to [Holmes].”).
46
Smith, supra note 39, at 61.
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for his claim that long work hours were dangerous to the health of women who worked those
hours in various Oregon industries. Furthermore, their working of those hours was also and
ultimately deleterious to the community’s health.47
Cardozo also served as an “eminent pioneer of the ‘realist’ movement.”48 He was the first
to speak to the various modes of judicial thinking that were not wholly consistent with sheer
logic. Cardozo theorized that there were four approaches to judicial decision-making:
philosophy, evolution, tradition, and sociology. The philosophical approach was analogous to
adherence to precedent.49 The evolution approach emphasized the historical development of a
field of law.50 The tradition approach referred to community customs.51 To Cardozo, the
sociological approach was a gap-filler,52 insofar as he believed the judge should employ the law
as a means to an end—for the “good of the collective body.”53 None but the latter was
remarkable given the times in which Cardozo made this pronouncement, and it was readily
seized upon by the Realists.
Pound became the immediate precursor to Realists.54 Generally, Pound believed in an
interdisciplinary approach to understanding the law.55 In 1905, he called for a philosophy of law
founded on social and political science.56 In 1910, he pled for law students to have training in
sociology, economics, and politics to “fit a new generation of lawyers” to not simply render good
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service but “to lead the people.”57 That same year, he urged scholars to not simply study “law on
the books” but also to study “law in action”58—harkening back to Holmes’ thoughts about the
life of the law. Thus, Pound called for an analysis of law not in theory only but in practice as
well in order to ascertain how law impacted people’s lives. In the 1911 and 1912 issues of the
Harvard Law Review, Pound announced and defined a vision of “Sociological Jurisprudence.”59
Among its elements, he argued for the realization of “the backwardness of law in meeting social
ends”;60 insistence upon the social effects of the law;61 and a belief in “the equitable application
of law”.62 Not surprisingly, Pound is described as one who did more than any of his
contemporaries in the way of emphasizing the “social effects of law and to relate legal thinking
to the social sciences.”63
C. IVY LEAGUE ICONOCLASTS AT COLUMBIA AND YALE LAW SCHOOLS
The writings of Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo and Pound made way for new thinking in the
legal academy. Their ideas—that law should be employed as a means to certain ends, the utility
of social science to law, and that law is not logic but real world experience—resonated with
professors at Columbia and Yale law schools. These professors seized upon the ideas of Holmes,
Brandeis, Cardozo and Pound, and set about divining a new American jurisprudence through the
Realist and Law, Science, and Policy movements as well as the Yale Divisional Studies
Program.
57
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1. Legal Realism
In 1916, Thomas Swan assumed the deanship at Yale Law School, and by November of
that year, he proposed, to Yale’s president, to expand the law school into the Yale School of Law
and Jurisprudence. The proposal seemingly reflected the views of Arthur Corbin and possibly
Karl Llewellyn—professor and student, respectively.64 Both of these men later became key
architects of Legal Realism. Their work, and the work of others at Columbia and Yale law
schools65 during the early to mid-twentieth century, helped to define a new agenda for legal
education and practice.
Legal Realism was not a monolithic school of thought. There were, broadly, three types
of Realists: 1) the critical oppositional variant that sought to expose the contradictions in
classical legal formalism; 2) the social scientific variant that employed the insights and methods
of the empirical sciences; and 3) the practical political variant that designed, made, and enforced
reform policies.66 The Realist’s jurisprudence was known by many names, but probably the most
appropriate was functionalism—“an attempt to understand law in terms of factual contexts and
economic and social consequences.”67 Quite possibly, the major contribution of the Realists was
to undermine the Langdellian idea that the law was an exact science based on objectively blackletter rules.68 Harkening back to Pound’s distinction between law in books and law in action, the
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67
KALMAN, supra note 65, at 3.
68
STEVENS, supra note 13, at 156.
65

11

Realists sought to determine what the law actually does to people and for people.69 As a result,
they saw law not simply as an end in and of itself but as a means to various ends.70
The distinctive feature of the Realists was their methodological approach. The first
approach was debunking,71 which was subjecting questionable judicial opinions to logical
analysis in order to expose their inconsistencies, unsubstantiated premises, and tendency to “pass
off contingent judgments as inexorable.”72 Debunking flowed from two methods of attack—rule
and fact skepticism. Rule skeptics argued that case decisions do not necessarily flow from
general legal propositions—that logic did not govern judicial thought processes.73 Other features
are factored into the equation74 such as policy considerations.75 Fact skeptics either argued that
the facts found by the judge or jury are inconsistent with the actual facts76 or that the reactions of
judges and juries to facts are unpredictable.77
The Realists’ second methodological approach was empirical social science.78 And
though they were not alone in their attempts to integrate social science and law,79 the empirical
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exploits of Realists such as Clark and Douglas at Yale,80 Moore at Yale,81 and Cook and
colleagues at Johns Hopkins82 set them apart from other sociological jurisprudes. Realists’
efforts towards integrating law with the social sciences ultimately failed for a number of likely
reasons. Realists did not know how non-legal materials should aid law students.83 Realists asked
the wrong questions of social science and expected too much from the answers.84 Furthermore,
social science was ultimately less helpful to legal scholars than anticipated.85 Two post-Realist
law professors, Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal, argued that lack of social science
methodological sophistication on the part of those making those integrative efforts resulted in the
Realism’s failure.86 Nonetheless, the Realists made a significant contribution towards integrating
social science and the law and using the law in practical ways. Ultimately, they provided an early
integration of law, social science, and public policy.87
Most of the canonical Realists, like adherents of other progressive reform movements,
avoided the hot racial issues of their day.88 However, their efforts to tackle race issues were
demonstrated in two ways. First, there were among them a few who tackled the race question
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head-on. Most notably, Karl Llewellyn,89 Morris Cohen,90 and Robert Hale91 attempted to create
a “Realist critique of American race relations.”92 Moreover, Llewellyn was an active supporter of
the NAACP during the 1920s and 1930s and was a self-proclaimed opponent of racial
segregation.93 He was even asked, at one point, to lead the NAACP’s Legal Committee by the
NAACP Board of Directors.94
Second, Charles Hamilton Houston, architect of the NAACP’s strategy to end school
segregation, was certainly a Realist. He provided not only a model for how social science could
be employed to effectuate change in laws bearing on racial equality. He also provided a model
for how racial policy could be changed and how both an academic and a practitioner could
employ those means. As such, Houston embodied both Realist philosophy and practice.
While attending Harvard Law School, Houston was a student of Realists such as Roscoe
Pound and Felix Frankfurter.95 In fact, Frankfurter was Houston’s J.S.D advisor.96 Not
surprisingly, Houston was well aware of Sociological Jurisprudence and Legal Realism. In fact,
Houstonian Jurisprudence made Howard, like Columbia and Yale, a center of Realist thought
and action.97 Houston believed that a lawyer was “either a social engineer or […] a parasite on
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society.”98 He defined a social engineer as a “highly skilled, perceptive, sensitive lawyer” who
understands the United States Constitution and knows how employ it in solving local,
community problems and in bettering underprivileged citizens’ conditions.99 As noted by
McNeil, between 1929 and 1948, Houston further refined his conception of a social engineer.100
This concept entailed five responsibilities for black lawyers. First, black lawyers had to be
“prepared to anticipate, guide and interpret group advancement.”101 Second, they had to be the
“mouthpiece of the weak and sentinel guarding against wrong.”102 Third, they had to ensure that
“the course of change is…orderly with a minimum of human loss and suffering,” and when
possible “guide…antagonistic and group forces into channels where they w[ould] not clash.”103
Fourth, black lawyers had to “use…the law as an instrument available to [the] minority unable to
adopt direct action to achieve its place in the community and nation.”104 Fifth, they had to engage
in “a carefully planned [program] to secure decisions, rulings and public opinion on broad
principle[s whilst] arousing and strengthening the local will to struggle.”105
Dating as far back as the 1947 Supreme Court cases Hurd v. Hodge,106 Urciolo v.
Hodge,107 and Shelley v. Kraemer,108 Houston and his colleagues employed sociological and
economic research in an effort to advance their cases.109 He created a viable litigation strategy
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out of an intellectual movement, which “manifested itself most famously in Brown.110 In fact,
one of the best ways to understand the Realists and their contribution to Brown is to see them as
advocates of a policy-oriented or aware jurisprudence. As such, their jurisprudential thought was
informed by developments in the behavioral and social sciences.111
2. The Law Policy Science Movement
Lasswell and McDougal, advanced two elements of Realism—social science and law as
well as law and public policy. McDougal was a Yale Law School graduate during the early
1930s and became a faculty member in 1934.112 While visiting at the University of Chicago, he
met political scientist Harold Lasswell.113 The two became friends, and Lasswell was ultimately
asked to join the Yale faculty as a professor of law and social science.114 As part of the general
Realist milieu at Yale, McDougal and Lasswell viewed Realism as useful at debunking the law’s
“old myths and lame theory,” but not offering much to take its place.115 They noted, in fact:

There is a limit beyond which the laborious demonstration of equivalencies in the
language of the courts cannot go; eventually the critic must offer constructive guidance as
to what and how courts and other decision-makers should decide the whole range of
problems importantly affecting public order.116
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Thus, they set out to develop an affirmative jurisprudence that would both incorporate law and
the social sciences and embody “democratic values.”117 Together, they attempted to synthesize
Legal Realism and empirical legal scholarship, which would be capable of formulating,
promoting, and critiquing policy.118 McDougal valued the social sciences but felt that such
scholarship in and of itself could not replace classical legal thought.119 Lasswell viewed himself
as a “policy scientist” and brought to bear on the law all of the intellectual techniques and skills
of a political scientist.120 Ultimately, they developed the Law, Science, and Policy movement.121
By 1943, they established part of the framework for Law, Science, and Policy in an
article calling for the radical reform of legal education.122 Their main objective was a curricular
reform movement within law schools, or more precisely, “elite” law schools. They contended
that law schools’ role was to train policy makers.123 At its core, Law, Science, and Policy was
concerned with authoritative decision-making. As such, policy scientists were concerned with
how those with political authority (e.g., legislatures, courts, administrative agencies, city
councils) made decisions.124 Another aspect of Law, Science, and Policy was value analysis,
which consisted of analyzing the values held by participants in the decisional process.125 Law,
Science, and Policy assumed that anyone applying its system of analysis was a rational actor who
attempts to maximize value.126 With such an ambitious agenda, James Hergert and Robert
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Stevens, respectively, saw Law, Science, and Policy as “bring[ing] realism to its completion”127
and as a “remarkable, albeit ultimately unsuccessful, synthesis.” 128 Numerous factors may have
jettisoned the Law, Science, and Policy movement. The policy-science jargon, the formalism of
the approach, or the dated social science it employed ultimately led to Law, Science, and
Policy’s demise.129 However, their approach may have been “too elitist, too expensive, […] too
academic” and ultimately too impractical for most American law schools.130
3. Yale’s Divisional Studies Program
In the wake of the Realist and Law, Science, and Policy movements, Yale Law School
embarked on a curricular reform effort.131 Yale’s 1946 Curriculum Committee Report echoed the
sentiments of Laswell and McDougal.132 The report’s authors specifically noted that legal
education should be “thoroughly” informed by the social sciences and that law students should
be taught by social scientists.133 They stated, as part of the goal of this curriculum, that law
students should be equipped “to analyze and assess the politics, economic and social, as well as
the historical and doctrinal, factors in legal policy.”134 Furthermore, they needed “a critical and
scientific understanding of the methods of study, analysis, and investigation which are used … in
the various sciences … included in the scope of legal studies.”135 The report’s final, general
recommendation was,
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…for the institution of faculty seminars for intellectual cross-fertilization; the restoration
of the requirement that second- and third-year students take small seminars; perhaps in
conjunction with the Yale Law Journal; the funding of postdoctoral research at the law
school by noted scholars from other disciplines; the recruitment of outside lecturers; and
the integration of psychiatry into the study of law.136

The law school took no affirmative steps on this report but re-examined the curriculum in
1955. This time, the report’s goals were more focused on three issues: First, it sought to prepare
its students for legal practice by teaching them how to specialize once in practice. Second, it
sought to improve students’ critical thinking and writing skills by placing them in small groups
focused on these areas. Third, and more germane to this article, the program sought to teach
students how to integrate law and social science.137 The program was finally implemented during
the 1956-57 academic year.138 However, by the early 1960s, the Divisional Studies Program had
petered-out.139
D. LAW “AND” MOVEMENTS AND THEIR PROGENY
Just as Columbia and Yale law schools blazed a new trail in American jurisprudence
during the first half of the twentieth century, so would Chicago and Wisconsin in the latter half.
The law and economics movement took root at Chicago while the law and society movement and
its progeny, Critical Legal Studies and Critical Race Theory, took shape at Wisconsin.

136

Id. at 370.
Id. at 371-373.
138
Id. at 377.
139
Id. at 390-395.
137

19

1. Law and Economics Movement
The law and economics movement, premised on the notion that the law should be
economically efficient,140 is one that has gained considerable momentum in recent decades. Its
roots trace back to the 1700s with the work of David Hume, Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, and
Jeremy Bentham.141 However, as an area of American jurisprudence, the movement took hold at
the University of Chicago.142 In 1937, the Chicago Law School developed an optional four-year
curriculum, part of which was reorganized to explore law’s social workings. A half-year course
called Law and Economic Organization focused on the “distribution of income and the business
cycle, economic theory, statistics, legal aspects of competition, control devises, and bankruptcy
and reorganization.”143 Two years later, Chicago Law School appointed the first economics
professor, Henry Simmons, to the law faculty.144
The law and economics movement truly came to light with Ronald Coase’s research
initiative at the London School of Economics, which gave rise to his 1937 essay, The Nature of
the Firm.145 In 1964, Coase joined the Chicago Law School’s faculty where he remained until
1982. During his tenure at Chicago, he served as editor and then co-editor of The Journal of Law
and Economics, which he used to advance the field.146 The writings of Coase147 and Guido
Calabresi148 in the 1960s further catapulted the law and economics movement and spread its
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methodological approach to torts, property, and contracts.149 The 1970s witnessed an everforward push of the movement with Calabresi’s The Cost of Accidents150 and Richard Posner’s
Economic Analysis of Law.151 Through the latter half of the twentieth century and early portion
of this century the law and economics movement has continued to flourish.
2. Law and Society Movement
In 1964, Harry Ball, coordinator of the University of Wisconsin’s Sociology and Law
Program, took the lead in advancing what would come to be known as the Law and Society
movement. During the American Sociological Association annual meeting, he invited all
attendees who were interested in the intersection of sociology and law to a breakfast.
Approximately ninety individuals attended the breakfast.152 From that effort, sociologists and
law professors developed the Law and Society Association as a rigorous interdisciplinary study
of law.153 Moreover, the development of the Law and Society Association seems to have had as
much to do with legitimizing soiolegal studies as it had to do with an efforts towards an
interdisciplinary exchange of ideas.154 Despite this interdisciplinary perspective, the locus of law
and society scholarship is not legal scholarship and law schools. Felice Levine, first national
President of the Law and Society Association, situates the locus at the interdisciplinary
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intersection of the social sciences, including but not privileging our law-trained colleagues
attracted empirical inquiry and law-related matters.”155
Though, initially, the law and society movement never saw itself as political, its goals
reflected the ideas of “people committed to moderate reform” and resonated among liberal
lawyers.156 Thus, many who came to the law and society movement were committed to
governmental intervention in the economy, moderate wealth redistribution, and governmental
intervention to ensure social equality for the disadvantaged, racial minorities, the accused and
mentally ill, as well as women.157 Not only were most law and society founders liberals; they
were also “legalists.” As legalists, they had faith in the law as a tool for progressive social
change. They believed in the liberalism of legal institutions and believed that through legal
means most of the flaws in American society would diminish.158
Generally, the law and society filed is the study of law in its social context.159 More
specifically, the law and society movement’s goal is to employ a social scientific study of the
law. However, if one is to study law as a social science, one must define law as more than a mere
set of rules and principles. Thus, law and society sought to define law “as a social institution, as
interacting behaviors, as ritual and symbol, as a reflection of interest group politics, [and] as a
form of behavior modification.”160 David Trubek describes five types of law and society actors.
The true scientist was a scientist who wanted to study the law. The social problem solver was a
scientist with a social mission to participate in social reform. The technician (e.g., statisticians
and survey researchers) simply provided their technical skills to an expanding field of legal
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studies. The imperial jurist believed social science would supplement legal doctrine and help the
law understand its own powers and limitations. Finally, the skeptical pragmatist did not believe
social science would replace legal studies but viewed it as a useful way to understand the legal
process.161
Conceptually, Trubek describes five elements that comprise the law and society
movement. The doctrine of systemicity argues that society is a system that contains interacting
elements comprised of individual and group behavior. The doctrine of objectivism argues that the
objective knowledge of law governs the legal system’s operation, its constituent parts, and that
its relation to other systems is realized through the scientific method. The doctrine of
disengagement argues that in order to develop such objective knowledge, there needs to be
scholarly institutions that disengage from the production of legal doctrine, education of legal
professionals, and goals of any societal group. The doctrine of univocality argues that the law
contains a set of normative standards available for critique and reconstruction. Finally, the
doctrine of progressivism argues for liberal reform.162
a. Critical Legal Studies
Critical Legal Studies emerged as one of the leading jurisprudential schools in the second
half of the 1970s through the 1980s.163 In 1976 Duncan Kennedy and David Trubek met and
discerned that there were a number of legal scholars around the country engaged in similar
scholarship. They decided to convene these individuals, and Mark Tushnet, then Dean of the
University of Wisconsin Law School, organized an academic conference.164 Many of these early
Critical Legal Studies scholars met at Yale. Of the nine organizing committee members, Duncan
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Kennedy, Rand Rosenblatt, and Mark Tushnet graduated from Yale in the early 1970s. Richard
Abel and Trubek taught at Yale. Roberto Unger was connected with Yale’s Law and
Modernization Program, and after graduating from Yale, Thomas Heller was a fellow in the
program. Only Morton Horowitz and Stewart Macaulay did not have Yale ties.165
Many of the Critical Legal Studies founders were formerly active in the law and society
movement. However, they ultimately disagreed with their law and society colleagues on key
issues. One of the factors that cleaved Critical Legal Studies from the law and society movement
was the debate about the importance of empirical social science. In an article in the Law and
Society Review,166 David Trubek assailed empirical social science.167 G. Edward White writes
that Trubek implied two things. First, he suggested that empirical research legitimates the status
quo in that it implies that research facts were objectively “there.” Second, he argued that a
scholar could not separate ideology from methodology in any type of research, including
empirical research. Ultimately, according to White, Trubek argued that “to be politically
reformist and methodologically neutral was a contradiction in terms.”168
While Critical Legal Studies is a direct extension of Legal Realism,169 it is largely so
through deconstruction of legal opinions and doctrine.170 Critical Legal Studies differs from
Realism in two respects, however. As noted, while Critical Legal Studies scholars had little faith
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in social science, the Realists endorsed social science and employed its methods. Additionally,
the ethical relativism endorsed by most Critical Legal Studies scholars was different from and
more coherent than that of the Realists.171 In the end, Critical Legal Studies has become
associated with politically Left-leaning law faculty172 and is based on three propositions. First,
law is indeterminate. Second, law is more accurately understood by paying attention to the
context in which it is made. Third, law is politics.173 Critical Legal Studies ultimately lost much
of its steam from cries that the movement was comprised of nihilists174 to critiques from
women175 and racial minorities.176
b. Critical Race Theory
Just as Realism was the precursor to the law and society movement, itself a precursor to
Critical Legal Studies, Critical Legal Studies was a precursor to Critical Race Theory.177
However, before one can understand Critical Legal Study’s influence on the development of
Critical Race Theory, it is important to understand the role of the seminal figure to its
development. Derrick Bell is the forerunner of Critical Race Theory 178 in two ways. Specifically,
his departure from Harvard Law School’s faculty in 1981 prompted Harvard law students to
wrangle with the Harvard’s dean over the marginalization of race in the curriculum. More
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broadly, his resignation created an issue around which legal scholars could rally and develop
intellectual relationships which grew over the course of a number of subsequent meetings.179
Bell also helped establish a scholarly agenda that placed race squarely at the center of
intellectual legal dialogue.180 This is best exemplified by his path-breaking book Race, Racism
and American Law.181 The aim of the book was to illustrate how laws help to systematically
disempower African Americans. Additionally, Bell’s litmus test for the efficacy of civil rights
laws was how well they contested the conditions of racial domination. As Crenshaw suggests,
Bell was a realist in that he assessed legal rules in terms of how they function within a racist
society. Furthermore, Bell was a Crit—a critical legal studies adherent—in that “he understood
the indeterminate and frequently contradictory character of the law.” 182
The Harvard dean’s refusal to allow a race and law course into the curriculum prompted a
group of students to organize an “Alternative Course.” Students of color initiated this class. They
raised money and brought in academics of color to teach the course from chapters in Bell’s book.
Among the scholars who participated were Charles Lawrence, Richard Delgado, Linda Greene,
Denise Carty-Bennia, and Neil Gotanda. Many of these individuals became central figures in
Critical Race Theory. Students Mari Matsuda and Kimberle Crenshaw played significant roles as
did Harvard’s Critical Legal Studies faculty. The course served as an important precursor to
Critical Race Theory in that it brought together a number of legal scholars and students to share
ideas on race and law.183
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More directly, Critical Legal Studies had its impact as well. Generally, the cleavage of
Critical Race Theory from Critical Legal Studies may have been, as described by Richard
Delgado, an inevitable result of the different worldviews of whites and people of color. For
example, many whites do not readily perceive racism. People of color, on the other hand, see and
are on the receiving end of it daily. This has two effects: First, “even the most sympathetic, leftleaning whites” have to constantly be re-educated about racism.184 Second, it colors each groups
“legal and political theorizing,” causing members of the respective groups to take different
stances on issues.185 As such, whites and people of color within the Critical Legal Studies
movement had fundamental differences in what they wanted in a legal theory.186
A more specific history shows that the 1985 Critical Legal Studies conference was
organized by its feminist wing—the FemCrits. Women of color were called upon to discuss how
they wanted to participate in the conference. Several invitees noted how they might discuss race
at the conference, which resulted in a racism workshop. The question that launched the workshop
was, “What is it about the whiteness of CLS that keep the people of color at bay?” Such a
question was not well-received by the “white male heavies of CLS.”187Two additional, specific,
events served to drive people of color from the ranks of the Critical Legal Studies movement.
First, during a visit at Stanford, white students complained of Derrick Bell’s approach to
teaching constitutional law and arranged a series of supplemental lectures by other faculty. Given
that Stanford was seen as a Critical Legal Studies stronghold, people of color within Critical
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Legal Studies were gravely concerned. Second, in the Critical Legal Studies newsletter, The
Lizard, there was a remark that bespoke a racial stereotype about Mexicans.188
Finally, at the 1987 Critical Legal Studies conference, attendees hosted a panel entitled
“The Minority Critique of CLS Scholarship (and Silence) on Race.” The panelists focused their
comments on the “racially specific culture of CLS, the critique of rights, and on the silencing of
voice[s] of color in the legal academy….”189 In 1988, Kimberle Crenshaw, Stephanie Phillips,
and Richard Delgado began discussions on how to convene individuals interested in the
intersection of Critical Legal Studies and race. At the time, Crenshaw was a visiting fellow,
Phillips was a Hastie Fellow, and Delgado was a professor. Together, they approached David
Trubek, director of the Wisconsin’s Institute of Legal Studies, for funds to support a workshop
initially called “New Developments in Race and Legal Theory”190 but ultimately changed to
Critical Race Theory.191 On July 8, 1989 , twenty-four Critical Race Theory Workshop
participants gathered in Madison, Wisconsin.192
They defined Critical Race Theory as “a race-based, systematic critique of legal
reasoning and legal institutions….”193 However, they created an area of jurisprudence that was
more than just theory. Critical Race Theory, in addition to being “critical” is in part an activist
agenda as it both tries to understand the plight of racial minorities and change it as well.194
Delgado and Jean Stefancic indicate that Critical Race Theory has three basic tenets: First,
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racism is normal—the way society operates and the common experience of people of color in the
U.S. Second, white-over-color dominance serves important psychic and physical purposes. Thus,
racism is difficult to remedy. Third, the concept of race is a social construction, a product of
people’s thoughts and relations.195 However, despite this seeming coherence, Critical Race
Theory is not merely a school of thought “with an overarching theoretical formulation.”196 It is
more accurately a site of resistance and debate.197 Hackney argues that Critical Race Theory is
better conceptualized as a project.198 Duncan Kennedy, as cited by Hackney, notes that “[a]
project is a continuous goal-oriented practical activity based on an analysis of some kind … but
the goals and the analysis are not necessarily internally coherent or consistent over time.”199
II. CRITICAL RACE REALISM: A DEFINITION AND DEVELOPMENT(S)
Several intellectual movements, schools of thought, and individuals have contributed, in
various ways, to what can be defined as Critical Race Realism. Here, Critical Race Realism
consists of 1) a deconstructive element—a systematic, race-based evaluation and critique of the
law and legal institutions and 2) a constructive element—a racially progressive policy agenda.
Both elements rely heavily on empirical social science. With this in mind, there is a long history
of liberal activism that has employed social science to end the racial status quo in America.
There has also been a conservative effort to shore it up. The twentieth century provides a number
of instances where the legal battle over racial equality in America has been fought employing
social science. For instance, just as social science was employed to advance the aims of the
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Brown v. Board of Education200 decisions to end school, racial segregation,201 there was also a
scientific effort to reverse the legal gains of those decisions.202
Charles Houston fought on the progressive side of that battle by employing social science
and seeking to effectuate change in law and public policy. As such, Houston embodied and put
into practice Realist philosophy; he was the exemplar of Critical Race Realism. Just as Houston
and his efforts provide a template for Critical Race Realism, contemporary efforts and
movements help situate it. Houston’s work and Brown’s effect was to create an increasingly
interdisciplinary approach to the law.203 Contemporary court cases dealing with race issues such
as Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,204 McCleskey v. Kemp,205 and Grutter v. Bollinger,206 reflects such
interdisciplinarity.207 In addition to this interdisciplinary legacy, Houston and Brown also pointed
a way toward a synthesis of social science and the law directed at changing public policy. It is
this legacy that I rely upon in looking at how Critical Race Realism may currently be
conceptualized. In this subsection, I focus on contemporary efforts towards integrating social
science, law, and public policy. I then square Critical Race Realism with these contemporary
movements.
A. CONTIGUOUS MODELS:
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES AND THE NEW LEGAL REALISM PROJECT
In light of efforts by the Legal Realists and the law and society movement, recent efforts
to integrate law and social science are afoot. A new and rigorous empiricism has found its place
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within legal academia. This is likely because empirical legal scholarship has two substantial
benefits. First, it arguably leads to objective knowledge, unfettered by personal prejudices.208
Second, it has incredible potential to affect public policy.209 As such, it is no surprise that
empirical legal scholarship has taken firm root within legal academia in recent years. A number
of indicators suggest this: For instance, the conference theme in 2006 for the annual meeting of
the Association of American Law Schools was “Empirical Scholarship: What Should We Study
and How Should We Study It?”210 Additionally, empirical legal scholarship is the “discernible
emerging trend” in hires among law faculty, and law schools have hired an increasing number of
JD/PhDs as faculty.211 Arguably, a significant number of these dual-degree hires are trained in
economics, or psychology, or sociology, or political science and presumably trained in empirical
methodologies. In addition to hires, recent legal academia trends suggest that law professors are
increasingly interested in and producing more empirical scholarship.212
Moreover, there is a growing infrastructure for producing and publishing empirical legal
scholarship. Several law schools offer courses in empirical methods to train their students.213 A
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number of institutions have “programs or initiatives” designed to increase the output of empirical
legal scholarship.214 Washington University in St. Louis has a Workshop on Empirical Research
in the Law.215 UCLA Law School has an Empirical Research Group.216 Harvard Law School has
a Program on Empirical Legal Studies.217 Wake Forest Law School has a Center for Student
Empirical Studies sponsored by its law review.218 Additionally, the Institute for Legal Studies at
the University of Wisconsin Law School,219 The Center for the Study of Law and Society at
Boalt Law School,220 and the Baldy Center at the University of Buffalo221 all support empirical
and interdisciplinary scholarship.
Additionally, not only are traditional law reviews publishing more empirical scholarship.
Faculty-edited, peer-reviewed journals such as the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Journal
of Legal Studies, Journal of Law and Economics, Law & Society Review, and Journal of Law,
Economics & Organization have emerged and rank among some of the most prestigious law
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journals.222 Cyberspace too has become a repository for empirical legal scholarship. The Social
Science Research Network’s Legal Scholarship Network, a major disseminator of scholarship,
includes a section on empirical legal scholarship.223 The recently launched Empirical Legal
Studies blog serves as a website where empirical legal scholars discuss research and
contemporary issues in the field.224 There has also been a growth in the number of conferences
focused on empirical legal scholarship. These range from small conferences, such as the
empirical legal scholarship conference at Northwestern Law School,225 to national conferences,
such as the empirical legal scholarship conference at the University of Texas-Austin Law
School.226 Beyond law schools, agencies such as the National Science Foundation’s Law and
Social Science division227 and the National Institute of Justice228 aid in the development of
empirical legal scholarship.
Recent efforts have attempted to create a formalized movement among empirical
scholars—the New Legal Realism Project. How this movement differs from the law and society
222

Colleen M. Cullen & S. Randall Kalberg, Chicago-Kent Law Review Faculty Scholarship Survey, 70 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1445, 1453 (1995) (noting that the Journal of Legal Studies is one of the most cited and prestigious journals
among law faculty); Eisenberg, supra note 209, at 1742; Heise, supra note 211, at 825.
223
To access the Experimental & Empirical Studies section See http://www.ssrn.com/lsn/index.html (last visited
November 5, 2006). Then click on “Subject matter eJournals” to the left of the page.
224
http://www.elsblog.org/about.html (last visited October 26, 2006). The ELS blog was developed to “advance
productive and interdisciplinary discourse among empirical legal scholars.”
225
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/faculty/conferences/EmpiricalWorkshopBrochure.pdf (last visited November 9,
2006).
226
http://www.utexas.edu/law/news/2005/112805_black.html (last visited November 9, 2006). Of the fifty-four
presentations, four explored the issue of race as indicated by the presentation abstracts at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/JELJOUR_Results.cfm?form_name=journalbrowse&journal_id=884320 (last visited
November 19, 2006). See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Implicit Theories and Capital Sentencing: An Experimental Study
(June 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=909603; Dan M. Kahan, Donald
Braman, John Gastil, Paul Slovic & C. K. Mertz, Gender, Race, and Risk Perception: The Influence of Cultural
Status Anxiety (April 7, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=723762; Katherine Y.
Barnes, Is Affirmative Action Responsible for the Achievement Gap Between Black and White Law Students?
(Washington U. School of Law Working Paper No. 06-07-01, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=913411;
Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race Neutral Justifications: Experimental
Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge Procedure, LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. (forthcoming)
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=922639.
227
http://www.nsf.gov/funding/pgm_summ.jsp?pims_id=5422&org=SES&from=home (last visited November 9,
2006).
228
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/ (last visited November 9, 2006).

33

movement seems unclear at this point.229 Nonetheless, for the past ten years, academics have
debated the need for a “new legal realism”.230 Finally, in 2005, the American Bar Foundation and
the University of Wisconsin Law School’s Institute for Legal Studies sponsored the first New
Legal Realism symposium,231 which resulted in the publication of several articles.232 The New
Legal Realism agenda consists of five points. First, it takes both a bottom-up and top-down
approach. A bottom-up approach necessitates that empirical research must support assertions
about the law’s impact on everyday people’s lives.233 Additionally, there must be a continued
effort to study decision-makers and institutions at the top. Furthermore, this bottom-up approach
requires an appreciation of “power arrangements and hierarchies” within our legal system.234
Second, new legal realists seek to facilitate some translation between law and social science—
bridge the gap between “epistemology[ies], methods, operating assumptions and overall
goals….”235 Third, new legal realists attempt to reconcile the issue that some believe that
empiricism is not unfettered by researcher subjectivity.236 Fifth, New Legal Realism must
broaden its horizon and focus on international as well as nation issues.237 Finally, New Legal
Realism incorporates not only empirical research and legal theory, it must also address policy
issues, too. In doing so, New Legal Realism cannot simply be a method of critique; it must also
point the way towards “positive social change.”238
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Over the past several years, the topic of race has taken some root within areas of
empirical legal scholarship and social science and law literature. Maybe the clearest indication of
this is the New Legal Realism symposium issue of the Wisconsin Law Review. Within the
launching of this new effort to put forth a serious integration of empirical methods and legal
scholarship, more than one-quarter of the articles focused on race issues.239 This suggests that
there is at least some effort on the part of empirical legal scholars to substantively address issues
of race.
B. CRITICAL RACE REALISM: CRITICAL RACE THEORY AND CONTEMPORARY MOVEMENTS
Narrowly conceptualized, Critical Race Realism is not new. As noted, Charles Hamilton
Houston balanced being a law school administrator, an academic, and a civil rights lawyer, a
practitioner. Moreover, law professors have engaged in social science, race and law as well as
race and empirical legal scholarship for years. Below, in subsection 1, I highlight the growth of
such scholarship as a way to 1) note who is actually engaged in this type of scholarship and 2)
help define what issues Critical Race Realism might continue to tackle and what new issues need
to be addressed. Subsection 2 further clarifies what Critical Race Realism is or could be and the
benefits stemming from this perspective. Subsection 3 suggests some ways in which Critical
Race Realism might be more firmly established.
1. A Systematic Analysis of Race, Social Science & Law Scholarship
To better clarify what I mean by Critical Race Realism, what follows is an analysis of
social science, race and law as well as race and empirical legal scholarship over the past twenty
years—since Critical Race Theory’s founding. My hope is that this will highlight the progression
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of this area of scholarship. The first analysis investigated social science, race and law as well as
race and empirical legal scholarship conducted by founders of Critical Race Theory. The second
investigated social science, race and law as well as race and empirical legal scholarship
conducted by law faculty at the most highly ranked law schools. The third investigated social
science, race and law as well as race and empirical legal scholarship published in the top-twenty
general law journals. The fourth investigated social science, race and law as well as race and
empirical legal scholarship published in a select number of law journals focused on race or civil
rights issues. The fifth investigated social science, race and law as well as race and empirical
legal scholarship published in interdisciplinary social science and law journals. The sixth
investigated unpublished social science, race and law as well as race and empirical legal
scholarship.
Analysis 1: Social Science, Race & Law and Race & Empirical Legal Scholarship
Conducted by Critical Race Theory Founders
For the first analysis, I selected the names of Critical Race Theory’s principle figures
from Crossroads, Directions, and a New Critical Race Theory chapter on the history of Critical
Race Theory 240 as well as Critical Race Theory: An Introduction.241 Aside from the founding
members, my focus was on African American principal figures.242 I then conducted a Westlaw
search of each individual’s journal and law review articles. The search terms were AU(first name
/2 last name) & “social scien!” empiric! quantitative /s race “African American”. The searches
were restricted between the founding year of Critical Race Theory, 1987, and 2006. Final
searches were conducted in October of 2006. In conjunction with this search method, results
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from analyses two through four were also perused to cross-check and ascertain whether
additional results were found not produced by this first analysis. Only those results that focused
on race and with at least one-fourth textual content about social science, race and law or race and
empirical legal scholarship served as actual results for this analysis. Additionally, if any utilized
result was part of a symposium, the other symposia articles were analyzed to determine if they
too fit within the aforementioned criteria. If they did, they were included in this analysis. These
results are listed below, journal articles with at least a designated section on social science, race
and law or race and empirical legal scholarship are footnoted.
This analysis only yielded two results. Between 1987 and 2001, principal Critical Race
Theory figures published no social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship
law journal articles.243 Between 2002 and 2006, they published two law journal articles.244
Thematically, both articles focused on race, law, and economics.245
Analysis 2: Social Science, Race & Law and Race & Empirical Legal Scholarship
Conducted by Faculty at Top Law Schools
For the second analysis, I employed U.S. News and World Report’s “America’s Best
Graduate Schools 2007” to identify the top twenty law schools.246 I then perused the websites for
those law schools to identify faculty possibly engaged in social science, race and law or race and
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empirical legal scholarship. I only included full-time faculty teaching doctrinal courses in the
analysis. Thus, I excluded emeritus faculty, visiting faculty, clinical faculty, adjunct faculty, and
fellows from the analysis. I then perused the websites of identified faculty to determine whether
they engaged in race scholarship. The terms race, antidiscrimination, civil rights, and
employment discrimination were employed in the search. For faculty engaged in
antidiscrimination, civil rights, or employment discrimination research, I also looked for
additional information which might suggest that they are particularly interested in race
scholarship as opposed to, for example, sexual discrimination or sexual orientation
discriminations scholarship. Specifically, this was determined by what type of scholarship they
published since 2000 or by what their other research foci were. For some faculty, their research
interests were clearly indicated on their website under Areas of Interest or Areas of Expertise.
For others, their research interest was gleaned from the courses they taught, their scholarship
since 2000, or identified on their Curriculum Vitae posted on their website. One hundred and one
faculty members were identified via this method.247

247

The professors at the following institutions were identified: At Yale, the eleven faculty members were Bruce
Ackerman, Ian Ayres, Richard Brooks, Harlon Dalton, Drew Days, III, John Donahue, Owen M. Fiss, Christine
Jolls, Dan M. Kahan, Vicki Schultz, and Reva Siegel. At Stanford, the five faculty members were R. Richard Banks,
Richard Thompson Ford, Pamela S. Karlan, Mark G. Kelman, and Alison D. Morantz. At Harvard, the five faculty
members were Lani Guinier, Randall L. Kennedy, Kenneth Mack, Charles J. Ogletree, and David B. Wilkins. At
Columbia, the seven faculty members were Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Elizabeth F. Emens, Jack Greenberg,
Olatunde Johnson, James Liebman, Kendall Thomas, and Patricia Williams. At NYU, the four faculty members
were Derrick Bell, Paulette Caldwell, Cynthia Estlund, and Deborah Malamud. At Chicago, the one faculty member
was Tracey L. Meares. There were none at the University of Michigan. At U. Penn, the five faculty members were
Regina Austin, Serena Mayeri, Anita L. Allen, Wendell Pritchett and David Rudovsky. At Boalt, the six faculty
members were Lauren B. Edleman, Christopher Edley, Jr., Ian F. Haney Lopez, Angela P. Harris, Linda Hamilton
Krieger, and Goodwin Liu. At U.V.A, the eleven faculty members were Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Kim Forde-Mazuri,
Risa Goluboff, John C. Jefferies, Jr., Michael J. Klarman, Richard A. Merrill, George Rutherglen, James E. Ryan,
Richard C. Schragger, J. H. Verkerke, and Ann Woolhandler. At Duke, the four faculty members were Mitu Gulati,
Trina Jones, Charles Clotfelter and Karla F. Hollow. At Northwestern, the four faculty members were Dorothy E.
Roberts, Leonard Rubinowitz, Mayer G. Freed and Charlton Copeland. At Cornell, the four faculty members were
Valarie Hans, Barbara J. Holden-Smith and Sheri Lynn Johnson. At Georgetown, the eight faculty members were
Charles F. Abernathy, Sheryll D. Cashin, Anthony E. Cook, Michael H. Gottesman, Emma Coleman Jordan, Charles
R. Lawrence, III, Mari J. Matsuda and Elizabeth Hayes Patterson. At U.C.L.A, the seven faculty members were
Gary Blasi, Devon W. Carbado, Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Joel F. Handler, Cheryl I. Harris, Jerry Kang and
Russell Robinson. Professor Crenshaw was double counted, as she holds a joint-appointment with Columbia and
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I then conducted a Westlaw search of each individual’s journal and law review articles.
The search terms were AU(first name /2 last name) & “social scien!” empiric! quantitative /s
race “African American”. The searches were restricted between the founding year of Critical
Race Theory, 1987, and 2006. Final searches were conducted in October of 2006. In conjunction
with this search method, results from analyses one, three and four were also perused to crosscheck and ascertain whether additional results were found not produced by this analysis. Only
those results that focused on race and with at least one-fourth textual content about social
science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship were included in this analysis.
Additionally, if any utilized result was part of a symposium, the other symposia articles were
analyzed to determine if they too fit within the aforementioned criteria. If they did, they also
served as actual results for this analysis. These results are listed below, journal articles with at
least a designated section on social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship
are footnoted.
This analysis yielded twenty-seven results. Between 1987 and 1991, faculty at the top
twenty law schools published two social science, race and law or race and empirical legal
scholarship law journal articles.248 These articles focused on how the intent standard works in
racial discrimination cases249 and the role of unconscious racism in criminal law.250 Between

U.C.L.A. At U.S.C., the five faculty members were Jody Armour, Kareem Crayton, Susan Estrich, Thomas Griffith
and Ariela Gross. The three Vanderbilt faculty professors were Robert Belton, Joni Hersch and Carol M. Swan. The
seven George Washington faculty were Paul Butler, Robert J. Cottrol, Charles B. Craver, Frederick M. Lawrence,
Spencer A. Overton, Alfreda Robinson and Michael Selmi. The University of Minnesota professors were Guy-Uriel
E. Charles and Alex M. Johnson, Jr. Finally, the University of St. Louis faculty members were Katherine Barnes,
Christopher Bracey, and Kimberly Jade Noorwood.
248
Two journal articles included sections dedicated to social science, race and law or race and empirical legal
scholarship. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Color of Truth: Race and the Assessment of Credibility, 1 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 261, 312-317 (1996) (describing the psychological dynamics of race and assessments of credibility); Randall L.
Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 13951402 (1988) (discussing judicial response to statistical evidence about racial disparities in capital sentencing).
249
See Theodore Eisenberg & Sherry Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards
Work? 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151 (1991) (providing an empirical analysis of the intent standard).
250
See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988).
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1992 and 1996, faculty at the top twenty law schools published five social science, race and law
or race and empirical scholarship law journal articles.251 These articles explore such topics as
discrimination in employment law,252 bail setting,253 how mental heuristics lead to racism in
legal contexts,254 and stereotyping and prejudice among legal decision-makers.255 Between 1997
and 2001, these faculty members published five social science, race and law or race and
empirical scholarship law journal articles.256 The topics explored were racial attitudes about
crime control257 and affirmative action.258 Between 2002 and 2006, these faculty members
published sixteen social science, race and law or race and empirical scholarship law journal
251

One journal article included a section dedicated to social science, race and law or race and empirical legal
scholarship. See Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1781, 1829-1838 (1996) (providing cost-benefit
analysis to narrow tailoring within the context of affirmative action).
252
See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) (exploring the intersection of cognitive psychology,
discrimination and employment law); Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An
Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
1073 (1992) (analyzing federal court decisions addressing the lack of interest defense since Title VII's enactment
with particular regards to race).
253
See Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail Setting, 46 STAN. L. REV. 987
(1994) (providing an empirical analysis of racial discrimination and bail setting).
254
See Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary
Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781 (1994) (describing, generally, how mental shortcuts or heuristics lead people to
be racist within the legal context)
255
See Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL.
L. REV. 733 (1995) (discussing how psychological research on stereotyping and prejudice may help legal decisionmakers break such habits within legal contexts).
256
One journal article included a section dedicated to social science, race and law or race and empirical legal
scholarship. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing
State Action, 49 STAN L. REV. 1111, 1135-1146 (1997) (discussing the utility of social science research on
unconscious bias and this research’s applicability to equal protection).
257
See Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: Criminal Enforcement and Perceptions of Fairness in
Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL L. REV. 1219 (2000) (providing an empirical analysis of minority communities’
perceptions of police criminal enforcement); Tracey L. Meares, Charting Race and Class Differences in Attitudes
Toward Drug Legalization and Law Enforcement: Lessons for Federal Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM L. REV. 137
(1997) (providing an empirical analysis of racial attitudes concerning drug legalization and enforcement).
258
See Ian Ayres & Fredrick E. Vars, When Does Private Discrimination Justify Public Affirmative Action?, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1577, 1587 (1998) (arguing that “the government can remedy shortfalls in private purchasing only
when the firms disadvantaged by the government's affirmative action were likely beneficiaries of the private
discrimination. This principle implies that the government cannot use affirmative action in one market to remedy
discrimination in another. But when purchasing a particular product, the government should be able to remedy
private discrimination against sellers of the same product. The but-for adjustment does just this to remedy shortfalls
in government purchasing; the single-market justification expands the procurement remedy to correct for shortfalls
in private purchasing”); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, A Critique of Instrumental Rationality: Judicial Reasoning About
the “Cold Numbers” in Hopwood v. Texas, 16 LAW & INEQ. 359 (1998); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights
Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251 (1998) (exploring the implications
of social cognition and social identity theory for the affirmative action debate).

40

articles.259 These articles explore such topics as Law and Economics,260 unconscious racism,261
how lawyers may advocate against racism,262 affirmative action in law school admissions,263 and
school desegregation.264 The results for this analysis are reported in Table 1. Only those law
schools with at least one result are tabled.

259

Three journal articles included sections dedicated to social science, race and law or race and empirical legal
scholarship. See John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Ross Feldmann, Education and Interrogation: Comparing
Brown and Miranda, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 321, 329-331 (2005) (indicating that Brown and Miranda both employed
extra-legal materials (i.e., social science and police manuals) to broaden their legal arguments); Guy-Uriel E.
Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, and the First Amendment Right of Association, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1209,
1229-1231 (2003) (employing social psychology towards understanding the relationship between individual and
group racial identity); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 , 1484-1489 (2004) (discussing resistance to
footnote 11 of Brown v. Board of Education where social scientific studies were employed to advance the arguments
for school integration).
260
See Ian Ayres, Fredrick E. Vars, & Nasser Zakariya, To Insure Prejudice: Racial Disparities in Taxicab Tipping,
114 YALE L.J. 1613 (2005) (providing an empirical analysis of racial discrimination in consumer economic
behavior—taxicab tipping); Carbado & Gulati, supra note 8 (discussing how workplace discrimination may be
understood from the intersection of law & economics and critical race theory); Ayres, supra note 8 (2003) (arguing
that race-contingent behavior is not undefined but actually knowable); Culp et al., supra note 8 (providing some
closing analysis on the continuing existence of racism in light of empirical scholarship on its pervasiveness).
261
See Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy,
and Social Justice, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1119 (2006) (describing how system justification theory may be understood in
light of implicit racial bias); R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt, & Lee Ross, Discrimination and Implicit
Racial Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1169 (2006) (describing how implicit racial bias relates
to racial bias, generally, and in the criminal justice system, specifically); Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn
Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539 (2004) (providing an
empirical analysis of the implicit racial attitudes of capital defense lawyers); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda
Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV 945 (2006) (describing the social scientific
underpinnings of implicit or “unconscious” racial bias); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral
Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997 (2006)
(describing the relationship between implicit racial bias and employment discrimination law); Christine Jolls & Cass
Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969 (2006) (describing the relations between implicit racial bias
and antidiscrimination law); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005) (describing the
ways in which communication law, cognitive psychological research, and implicit racial bias intersect); Jerry Kang
& Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of Affirmative Action, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063
(2006) (describing how affirmative action can be approached in light of implicit racial bias).
262
See Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons From Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV.
1241, 1241 (2002) (providing “a brief overview of the rapidly developing science regarding stereotypes and
prejudice, and … the implications for lawyers and other advocates”); Blasi & Jost, supra note 261.
263
See Ian Ayres & Richard Brooks, Does Affirmative Action Reduce the Number of Black Lawyers?, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1807 (2005) (providing an empirical rebuttal to the argument that affirmative action in law schools serves to
reduce the number of black lawyers).
264
See James E. Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence in Modern Desegregation Cases, 81 N.C.
L. REV. 1659 (2003) (discussing the influence of social science on modern school desegregation cases).
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Table 1. Law Faculty Engaged in Race/Social Science Research
1987-1991
1992-1996
1997-2001
2002-2006
Total
Yale (11)
0
2
2
4
8
Stanford (5)
0
0
0
1
1
Harvard (5)
0
0
0
0
0
U. Chicago (1) 0
0
1
0
1
Boalt (6)
0
1
1
3
5
UVA (11)
0
0
1
1
2
Cornell (4)
2
0
0
1
3
UCLA (6)
0
0
0
5
5
USC (5)
0
2
0
0
2
2
5
5
15
27
Total
Note. The number of faculty at each law school is indicated in parentheses next to each school’s
name.
Analysis 3: Social Science, Race & Law and Race & Empirical Legal Scholarship
Published in the Top-twenty, General Law Journals
In the third analysis, I employed Washington & Lee Law School’s journal ranking system
to identify the top, general law journals.265 My search query was for U.S., General journals. I
searched the most recent database update, 2005, by impact-factor (IF) and selected the top
twenty journal.266 I then conducted a Westlaw search of each journal. Under “Search these
databases”, I input each journal, separately. Then for each journal, the search terms employed
were “social scien!” empiric! quantitative /s race “African American”. The searches were
restricted between 1987 and 2006. Final searches were conducted in October of 2006. In
conjunction with this search method, results from analyses one, two and four were also perused
to cross-check and ascertain whether additional results were found not produced by this analysis.

265

http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/ (last visited October 1, 2006). I only include the top twenty general law journals in my
analysis as a way to streamline the analysis. I realize that my methodological approach excludes many articles that
are published in various other general law journals. However, it would be prohibitive to conduct an analysis of all
general law journals given the scope of this article.
266
The identified journals were: YALE L.J., COLUM REV., N.Y.U. REV., CORNELL L. REV., STAN L. REV., VA. L.
REV., HARV. L. REV., CAL. L. REV., U. PA. L. REV., DUKE L.J., VAND. L. REV., MINN. L. REV., U. CHI. L. REV.,
UCLA L. REV., NW. U. L. REV., TEX. L. REV., S. CAL. L. REV., WM. & MARY L. REV., IND. L. REV., and IOWA L.
REV.
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Only those results that focused on race and with at least one-fourth textual content about social
science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship served as actual results for this
analysis. Additionally, if any utilized result was part of a symposium, the other symposia articles
were analyzed to determine if they too fit within the aforementioned criteria. If they did, they
also served as actual results for this analysis. These results are listed below, journal articles with
at least a designated section on social science, race and law or race and empirical legal
scholarship are footnoted.
This analysis yielded forty-four results. Between 1987 and 1991, the top twenty, general
law reviews published three social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship
law journal articles.267 These articles focused on how the intent standard worked in racial
discrimination cases,268 the role of unconscious racism in criminal law269 and an empirical
analysis of how employment discrimination litigation has changed.270 Between 1992 and 1996,
the top twenty, general law reviews published seven social science, race and law or race and
empirical legal scholarship law journal articles.271 These articles explore such topics as

267

Four journal articles dedicated a section to social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship.
See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1066-1069 (1991)
(discussing the role of social science in explaining the relationship between race and the law school context);
Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1388, 1395-1402 (1988) (discussing judicial response to statistical evidence about racial disparities in capital
sentencing); Race and the Prosecutor’s Charging Decision, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1520, 1525-1532 (1988) (discussing
empirical studies on race of defendant and the prosecutor’s decision to charge); Matthew L. Spitzer, Justifying
Minority Preferences in Broadcasting, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 319-346 (1991) (describing the social scientific
approach to understanding broadcast owner’s characteristics and programming choices).
268
See Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 249 (providing an empirical analysis of the intent standard).
269
See Johnson, supra note 250.
270
See John J. Donahue, III & Peter Siegleman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43
STAN. L. REV. 983 (1991).
271
Two journal articles included sections on social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship. See
Ayres, supra note 251 (providing cost-benefit analysis to narrow tailoring within the context of affirmative action);
Michael John Weber, Immersed in an Educational Crisis: Alternative Programs for African-American Males, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1099, 1102-1121 (1993) (discussing empirical support for African American male public schools).
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discrimination in employment law,272 bail setting,273 and lending.274 They also explore how
mental heuristics lead to racism in legal contexts,275 economic analysis of racial
discrimination,276 and stereotyping and prejudice among legal decision-makers.277 Between 1997
and 2001, the top twenty, general law reviews published five social science, race and law or race
and empirical legal scholarship law journal articles.278 These articles focused on affirmative
action279 and racial attitudes about crime control.280 Between 2002 and 2006, the top twenty,

272

Krieger, supra note 252 (exploring the intersection of cognitive psychology, discrimination and employment
law); Schultz & Petterson, supra note 252 (analyzing federal court decisions addressing the lack of interest defense
since Title VII's enactment with particular regards to race).
273
See Ayres & Waldfogel, supra note 253 for a discussion of an empirical analysis of racial discrimination and bail
setting.
274
See Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A Law and Economics Analysis, 73 TEX.
L. REV. 787 (1995) (applying law and economics analysis to lending discrimination).
275
See Armour, supra note 254 (describing, generally, how mental shortcuts or heuristics lead people to be racist
within the legal context)
276
See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race
Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995) (providing an economic analysis of group formation and racial
discrimination); Swire, supra note 274.
277
See Armour, supra note 255 (discussing how psychological research on stereotyping and prejudice may help
legal decision-makers break such habits within legal contexts).
278
Eight journal articles dedicated a section to social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship.
See Delgado, supra note 243; Tanya Katerí Hernández, Sexual Harassment and Racial Disparity: The Mutual
Construction of Gender and Race, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 183, 186-190 (2001). Hernández reviews some
statistical “evidence that suggests that women of color are disproportionately targeted as victims of sexual
harassment in the United States.”; Blake D. Morant, Law, Literature, and Contract: An Essay in Realism, 4 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 1, 25-28 (1998) (discussing the relationship between social psychology, race, and contract law); Steven
A. Ramirez, A General Theory of Cultural Diversity, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 33, 40-51 (2001) (discussing social
scientific conceptions of race); Steven A. Ramirez, The New Cultural Diversity and Title VII, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L.
127, 137-139 (2000) (describing the empirical research on diversity); Siegel, supra note 256 (discussing the utility
of social science research on unconscious bias and this research’s applicability to equal protection); Kim TaylorThompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1272-1276, 1290-1295 (2000) (discussing
the social scientific research on the effects of majority rule and empirical evidence on the impact of juror race in jury
deliberations); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 956, 983-991 (1999) (exploring how social science clarifies how race impacts polices officer’s assessment of
probable cause and reasonable suspicion).
279
See Ayres & Vars, supra note 258 (arguing that “the government can remedy shortfalls in private purchasing
only when the firms disadvantaged by the government's affirmative action were likely beneficiaries of the private
discrimination. This principle implies that the government cannot use affirmative action in one market to remedy
discrimination in another. But when purchasing a particular product, the government should be able to remedy
private discrimination against sellers of the same product. The but-for adjustment does just this to remedy shortfalls
in government purchasing; the single-market justification expands the procurement remedy to correct for shortfalls
in private purchasing”); Krieger, supra note 258 (exploring the implications of social cognition and social identity
theory for the affirmative action debate); Deborah Jones Merrittt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and Credentials:
The Truth About Affirmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 199 (1997) (exploring the effects of
race and sex on tenure-track hiring at accredited law schools); Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal
Education: An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Facto in Law School Admission
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general law reviews published twenty-nine social science, race and law or race and empirical
legal scholarship law journal articles.281 These articles explore such topics as Law and
Economics,282 unconscious racism,283 racial disparities in medical care,284 racial profiling,285 and

Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1997) (demonstrating, through empirical methods, that affirmative action is likely
needed to maintain a diverse law student body).
280
See Brooks, supra note 257 (providing an empirical analysis of minority communities’ perceptions of police
criminal enforcement).
281
Twelve journal articles included sections dedicated to social science, race and law or race and empirical legal
scholarship. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 5-10 (2006) (discussing the relevance of implicit bias to employment discrimination law); Blume et al.,
supra note 259, 329-331 (indicating that Brown and Miranda both employed extra-legal materials (i.e., social
science and police manuals) to broaden their legal arguments); Jennifer C. Braceras, Killing the Messenger: The
Misuse of Disparate Impact Theory to Challenge High-Stakes Educational Tests, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1111, 11861187 (2002 (critiquing the notion that disparate impact theory should be employed to minimize ‘statistical
discrimination.’ “[S]tatistical discrimination in the employment context occurs when employers, lacking perfect
information regarding a job applicant's potential for success on the job, rely upon proxies [high-stakes test scores]
that are closely correlated with race and only loosely correlated with productivity”); Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation,
90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 25-42 (2005) (describing the social scientific rationales for why discrimination claimants need
to be protected); Charles, supra note 259 (employing social psychology towards understanding the relationship
between individual and group racial identity); Daniel M. Filler, Silence and the Racial Dimension of Megan’s Law,
89 IOWA L. REV. 1535, 1578-1581, 1582-1587 (2004) (suggesting that the lack of racial data and social scientific
explanations help clarify why there is no racialized critique of Megan’s Law); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Does a
Diverse Judiciary Attain a Rule of Law that is Inclusive?: What Grutter v. Bollinger Has to Say About Diversity of
the Bench, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 101, 131-137 (2004) (describing empirical studies exploring the relationship
between judges’ personal attributes such as race, political affiliations and their rulings); Joy Milligan, Pluralism in
America: Why Judicial Diversity Improves Legal Decisions About Political Morality, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1206,
1212-1230 (2006) (describing how social science aids in our understanding of how political morality varies among
U.S. racial groups and how such variation relates to judicial decision-making); Radha Natarajan, Racialized Memory
and Reliability: Due Process Applied to Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identifications, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1821, 18341839 (2003) (describing psychological studies on cross-racial eye witness testimony); Yoav Sapir, Neither Intent
Nor Impact: A Critique of the Racially Based Selective Prosecution Jurisprudence and a reform Proposal, 19 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 127, 130-133 (2003) (providing empirical evidence of race and prosecutorial discretion); Siegel,
supra note 259 (discussing resistance to footnote 11 of Brown v. Board of Education where social scientific studies
were employed to advance the arguments for school integration).
282
See Ayres, Is Discrimination Elusive, supra note 8 (arguing that race-contingent behavior is not undefined but
actually knowable); Ayres et al., supra note 260 (providing an empirical analysis of racial discrimination in
consumer economic behavior—taxicab tipping); Carbado & Gulati, supra note 8 (discussing how workplace
discrimination may be understood from the intersection of law & economics and critical race theory); Case, supra
note 8 (describing “first, the need to examine and articulate far more precisely the victim’s preferences and concerns
in shaping remedies for many kinds of discrimination…; and second, the relationship of anecdote to data); Culp et
al., supra note 8 (providing some closing analysis on the continuing existence of racism in light of empirical
scholarship on its pervasiveness); Freshman, Prevention Perspectives, supra note 8 (exploring how one prevents
various forms of discrimination); Freshman, Revisioning the Constellation, supra note 8 (setting the stage for a
discussion about Critical Race Theory and Law & Economics); Haynes, supra note 8 (describing the pervasiveness
of racism in light of empirical research); Moran, supra note 9.
283
See Banks et al., supra note 261 (describing how implicit racial bias relates to racial bias, generally, and in the
criminal justice system, specifically); Blasi & Jost, supra note 261 (describing how system justification theory may
be understood in light of implicit racial bias); Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 261 (describing the social scientific
underpinnings of implicit or “unconscious” racial bias); Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 261 (describing the relations
between implicit racial bias and antidiscrimination law); Kang, supra note 261(describing the ways in which
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how lawyers may advocate against racism.286 Other articles focused on education issues: Brown
v. Board of Education,287 education finance reform,288 affirmative action in law school
admissions,289 and how well the LSAT predicts racial differences in educational attainment.290
The results of this analysis are in Table 2. Only those journals with at least one published article
on social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship are tabled.

communication law cognitive psychological research, and implicit racial bias intersect); Kang & Banaji, supra note
261 (describing how affirmative action can be approached in light of implicit racial bias); Krieger & Fiske, supra
note 261 (describing the relationship between implicit racial bias and employment discrimination law); Michael S.
Shin, Redressing Wounds: Finding A Legal Framework to Remedy Racial Disparities in Medical Care, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 2047, 2049 (2002) (exploring how “implicit cognitive bias, in the form of implicit attitudes and stereotypes,
significantly contributes to these racial disparities in medical treatment”).
284
See Shin, supra note 283.
285
See Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil Liberties, and
Constitutional Literature, and Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275 (2004) (clarifying “the
empirical controversies surrounding racial profiling and thereby shed light on the policy and constitutional law
debates”).
286
See Blasi, supra note 262, at 1241 (providing “a brief overview of the rapidly developing science regarding
stereotypes and prejudice, and … the implications for lawyers and other advocates”); Blasi & Jost, supra note 261
(describing how system justification theory may be understood in light of implicit racial bias).
287
See Sanjay Mody, Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social Science and the Supreme Court’s Quest
for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 793 (2002) (discussing Brown v. Board of Education’s social science footnote and
its impact on legitimizing the United States Supreme Court’s controversial decision).
288
See Yohance C. Edwards & Jennifer Ahern, Unequal Treatment in State Supreme Courts: Minority and City
Schools in Education and Finance Reform Litigation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 326 (2004) (providing an empirical
analysis of to what degree predominant race and setting of plaintiff school districts have an influence on the
outcome of education finance reform litigation).
289
Ayres & Brooks, supra note 263, (providing an empirical rebuttal to the argument that affirmative action in law
schools serves to reduce the number of black lawyers); David L. Chambers, Timothy T. Clydesdale, William C.
Kidder & Richard O. Lempert, The Real Impact of Eliminating Affirmative Action in American Law Schools: An
Empirical Critique of Richard Sander’s Study, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1807 (2005) (providing an empirical rebuttal to the
argument that affirmative action in law schools serves to reduce the number of black lawyers); Daniel E. Ho, Why
Affirmative Action Does Not Cause Black Students to Fail the Bar, 114 YALE L.J. 1997 (2005) (providing an
empirical rebuttal to the argument that affirmative action in law schools serves to reduce the number of black
lawyers); Richard H. Sander, A Reply to Critics, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1807 (2005) (providing an empirical rejoinder to
critics of his argument that affirmative action in law school admissions serves to reduce the number of black
lawyers); Richard H. Sander, A Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 367 (2005) (providing an empirical critique of affirmative action in law school admissions and arguing that it
serves to reduce the number of black lawyers); Richard H. Sander, Mismeasuring the Mismatch: A Response to Ho,
114 YALE L.J. 1997 (2005) (providing commentary on Ho’s empirical rebuttal to the argument that affirmative
action in law schools serves to reduce the number of black lawyers).
290
See William C. Kidder, Does the LSAT Mirror or Magnify Racial and Ethnic Differences in Educational
Attainment?: A Study of Equally Achieving “Elite” College Students, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1058 (2001). Kidder
“provide[s] empirical answers to the question of whether students of color with the same undergraduate grades
systematically score lower on the LSAT than white students, even when controlling for factors such as which
college they attended and what undergraduate major they selected. I also compare differences in law school grades
to differences in LSAT scores.”
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Table 2. Race/Social Science Scholarship in General Law Journals
1987-1991 1992-1996 1997-2001 2002-2006 Total
Journal/Year
YALE L. J.
0
0
0
4
4
COLUM. L. REV.
0
0
3
0
3
N.Y.U. L. REV.
0
0
1
1
2
CORNELL. L. REV.
2
0
0
0
2
STAN. L. REV.
1
3
0
12*
16
HARV. L. REV.
0
1
0
1
2
CAL. L. REV.
0
1
1
8*
10
U. CHI. L. REV.
0
1
0
0
1
UCLA L. REV.
0
0
0
1
1
NW. U. L. REV.
0
0
0
1
1
TEX. L. REV.
0
1
0
0
1
WM. & MARY L. REV.
0
0
0
1
1
3
7
5
29
44
Total
Note: An asterisk denotes a period where more than one noted journal article was part of a
symposium. Two symposia were identified for the Stanford Law Review291 and one for the
California Law Review.292
Analysis 4: Social Science, Race & Law and Race & Empirical Legal Scholarship
Published in Race and Civil Rights Law Journals
In the fourth analysis, I employed Washington & Lee Law School’s journal ranking
system to identify law journals on race or civil rights.293 My first search was for civil rights
journals; the search query was for U.S., Human Rights, Civil Rights journals. My second search
was for journals on race; the search query was U.S., Minority, Race and Ethnic Issues journals.
For both searches, I searched for the most recent database update, 2005, by impact-factor (IF).
Additionally, I only selected those journals which were above the mean rank to focus on the top
journals in both categories. This search yielded seven journals: Michigan Journal of Race & Law
(founded in 1996); Boston College Third World Law Journal (founded in 1980); Law and
Inequality (founded in 1983); Journal of Gender, Race and Justice (founded in 1997); Harvard
Blackletter Law Journal (founded in 1984); N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change (founded
291

Book Review Symposium, 55 STAN L. REV 2267 (2003).
Symposium, Behavioral Realism, 94 CAL. L. REV 945 (2006).
293
http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/ (last visited October 1, 2006).
292
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in 1971); and Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review (founded in 1966). I then
conducted a Westlaw search of each journal. Under “Search these databases”, I input each
journal, separately. Then for each journal, the search terms employed were “social scien!”
empiric! quantitative /s race “African American”. The searches were restricted between 1987
and 2006. Final searches were conducted in October of 2006. Since In conjunction with this
search method, results from analyses one, two and four were also perused to cross-check and
ascertain whether additional results were found not produced by this analysis. Only those results
that focused on race and with at least one-fourth textual content about social science, race and
law or race and empirical legal scholarship served as actual results for this analysis. Additionally,
if any utilized result was part of a symposium, the other symposia articles were analyzed to
determine if they too fit within the aforementioned criteria. If they did, they also served as actual
results for this analysis. These results are listed below, journal articles with at least a designated
section on social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship are footnoted.
This analysis yielded four results. Between 1987 and 1996, the top race/civil rights law
journals published no social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship law
journal articles.294 Between 1997 and 2001, they published one social science, race and law or
race and empirical legal scholarship law journal articles. This article critiqued reliance on cold
numbers in law school admissions.295 Between 2002 and 2006, the top race/civil rights law
journals published three social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship law

294

Five journal articles included sections dedicated to social science, race and law or race and empirical legal
scholarship. See Hernández, supra note 278; Blake D. Morant, Law, Literature, and Contract: An Essay in Realism,
4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 25-28 (1998) (discussing the relationship between social psychology, race, and contract
law); Johnson, supra note 248, at 312-317 (describing the psychological dynamics of race and assessments of
credibility); Steven A. Ramirez, A General Theory of Cultural Diversity, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 33, 40-51 (2001)
(discussing social scientific conceptions of race); Steven A. Ramirez, The New Cultural Diversity and Title VII, 10
MICH. J. RACE & L. 127, 137-139 (2000) (describing the empirical research on diversity).
295
See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, supra note 258 (critiquing over-reliance on rigid LSAT scores in law school
admission in the context of affirmative action).
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journal articles.296 These articles focused on affirmative action,297 the degree to which inmates’
Afrocentric features impacts the length of their sentences,298 and unconscious racism.299
Analysis 5: Social Science, Race & Law and Race & Empirical Legal Scholarship
Published in Interdisciplinary, Social Science & Law Journals
In the fifth analysis, I employed the methodology Tracey George utilized in An Empirical
Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship to identify interdisciplinary journals.300 I selected journals
based on the following criteria: The journal’s subject matter must be law and a social science.
The journal must be peer-reviewed. Both law professors and social scientists must publish in the
journal. Both law professors and social scientists must serve as editors and referees. The journal
must also be part of a legal citation index or legal database. Each edition of each journal between
the years 1987 and 2006 was searched via e-journals. Where an edition of the journal was not
accessible electronically, I manually searched the journal. The search terms were race, African
American and black. Where an abstract was provided, only the abstract was searched. Only those
results that focused on race and with at least one-fourth textual content about social science, race
and law or race and empirical legal scholarship served as actual results for this analysis.
Additionally, if any utilized result was part of a symposium, the other symposia articles were
analyzed to determine if they too fit within the aforementioned criteria. If they did, they also
served as actual results for this analysis. Only studies that focused on the United States and

296

One journal article included a section dedicated to social science, race and law or race and empirical legal
scholarship. See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Does a Diverse Judiciary Attain a Rule of Law that is Inclusive?: What
Grutter v. Bollinger Has to Say About Diversity of the Bench, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 101, 131-137 (2004)
(describing empirical studies exploring the relationship between judges’ personal attributes such as race, political
affiliations and their rulings).
297
See Brian N. Lizotte, The Diversity Rationale: Unprovable, Uncompelling, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 625 (2006).
298
See William T. Pizzi, Irene V. Blair, & Charles M. Judd, Discrimination in Sentencing on the Basis of
Afrocentric Features, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 327 (2005).
299
See Reshma J. Saujani, “The Implicit Association Test”: A Measure of Unconscious Racism in Legislative
Decisionmaking, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 395 (2003).
300
See George, supra note 212, at 153-156.
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Canada were included in the analysis. The results are noted below. Journal articles with at least a
designated section on social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship are
footnoted.
This analysis yielded one hundred thirteen results. Between 1987 and 1991, the
interdisciplinary social science and law journals published nine social science, race and law or
race and empirical legal scholarship articles. These articles focus on criminal justice,301 social
control,302 and voting.303 They also explore issues related to the judiciary,304 social science in
Supreme Court decisions,305 and affirmative action.306 Between 1992 and 1996, the
interdisciplinary social science and law journals published twenty-three social science, race and
law or race and empirical legal scholarship articles. These articles focus on social science, race,
and law, generally.307 They also focus on antisocial behavior,308 juries,309 police,310 sentencing,311

301

See Noval Morris, Race and Crime: What Evidence is There that Race Influences Results in the Criminal Justice
System?, 72 JUDICATURE 111 (1988) (assessing the role of race within the criminal justice system).
302
See Charles David Phillips, Exploring Relations Among Forms of Social Control: The Lynching and Execution of
Blacks in North Carolina, 1889-1918, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 361 (1987) (exploring how various forms of
aggression against blacks in the late 19th and early 20th centuries served as social controls over blacks)
303
See Linda A. Foley, Florida After the Furman Decision: The Effect of Extralegal Factors on the Processing of
Capital Offense Cases, 5 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 457 (1987) (exploring the existence of racial discrimination in capital
sentencing); Arthur Lupia & Kenneth McCue, Why the 1980s Measures of Racially Polarized Voting are Inadequate
for the 1990s, 12 LAW & POL’Y 353 (1990) (discussing a more effective way of analyzing racially polarized voting).
304
See Richard L. Engstrom, When Blacks Run for Judge: Racial Divisions in the Candidate Preferences of
Louisiana Voters, 73 JUDICATURE 87 (1989) (exploring racial differences in election of black judges); Cassia Spohn,
The Sentencing Decisions of Black and White Judges: Expected and Unexpected Similarities, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
1197 (1990) (analyzing, comparatively, the sentencing decisions of black and white judges).
305
See Alan J. Tomkins & Kevin Oursland, Social and Social Scientific Perspectives in Judicial Interpretations of
the Constitution: A Historical View and Overview, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 101 (1991) (discussing the Court’s
utilization of social science in rendering decisions on difficult social issues).
306
See Rupert Barnes Nacoste, Sources of Stigma: Analyzing the Psychology of Affirmative Action, 12 LAW & POL’Y
175 (1990) (exploring the psychological implications of affirmative action).
307
See Valerie P. Hans & Ramiro Martinez, Jr., Intersections of Race, Ethnicity, and the Law, 18 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 211 (1994) (providing a broad overview of social science research on race and law); Darnell F. Hawkins,
Afterword, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 351 (1994) (providing a general summation on the intersection of social
science, race, and law); Alan Tomkins, Race Discrimination, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 151 (1992) (providing opening
comment on race and law for a special issue on the topic).
308
See Dorothy L. Taylor, Frank A. Biafora, Jr., & George W. Warheit, Racial Mistrust and Disposition to Deviance
Among African American, Haitian, and Other Caribbean Island Adolescent Boys, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 291
(1994) (testing whether racial mistrust relates to a willingness, among black boys, to engage in delinquent behavior).
309
See Diedre Golash, Race, Fairness, and Jury Selection, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 155 (1992) (exploring whether
racial composition of juries improves fairness).
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and capital punishment.312 Furthermore, these articles also address issues such as affirmative
action,313 employment discrimination,314 hate crimes,315 and dispute resolution.316 Lastly, they
also tackle parental rights issues,317 development issues for poor women, 318 politics,319 and
regulation within the trucking industry.320 Between 1997 and 2001, the interdisciplinary social
science and law journals published forty-two social science, race and law or race and empirical
legal scholarship articles. These articles focus on the judiciary,321 juries,322 eye-witness

310

See Linda Gottfredson, Racially Gerrymandering the Content of Police Tests to Satisfy the U.S. Justice
Department: A Case Study, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 418 (1996) (analyzing how the effect of lowering the merit
relatedness of police tests in the service of race-based)
311
See James W. Meeker, Paul Jesilow, & Joseph Aranda, Bias in Sentencing: A Preliminary Analysis of Community
Service Sentences, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 197 (1992) (exploring whether judges demonstrate racial bias in their
sentencing); Laura T. Sweeney & Craig Haney, The Influence of Race on Sentencing: A Meta-Analytic Review of
Experimental Studies, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 179 (1992) (meta-analyzing the relationship between race and
sentencing).
312
See Austin Sarat, Speaking of death: Narratives of Violence in Capital Trials, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 19 (1993)
(analyzing how violence and pain are dealt with in legal discourse within the context of a cross-racial crime);
Jonathan R. Sorensen & Donald H. Wallace, Capital Punishment in Missouri: Examining the Issue of Racial
Disparity, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 61 (1995) (examining racial disparities in capital punishment).
313
See Winfred Arthur, Jr., Dennis Doverspike, & Rick Fuentes, Recipient’s Affective Responses to Affirmative
Action Interventions: A Cross-Cultural Perspective, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 229 (1992) (exploring how cultural
differences effect racial group differences about affirmative action); Susan D. Clayton, Remedies for
Discrimination: Sex, Race, & Affirmative Action, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 245 (1992) (discussing affirmative action
within the contexts of race versus sex); Richard B. Darlington, A Commentary on Affirmative Action, the Evolution
of Intelligence, the Regression Analyses in The Bell Curve, and Jensen's Two-Level Theory, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y
& L. 635 (1996).
314
See Ramona .L. Paetzold, Multicollinearity and Use of Regression Analysis in Discrimination Litigation, 10
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 207 (1992) (discussing the difficulty of analyzing regression models of employment
discrimination).
315
See Phyllis B. Gertenfeld, Smile When You Call Me That!: The Problems With Punishing Hate Motivated
Behavior, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 259 (1992) (critiquing hate crime laws).
316
See E. Allan Lind, Yuen J. Hou, & Tom R. Tyler, …And Justice for All: Ethnicity, Gender, and Preferences for
Dispute Resolution Procedures, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269 (1994) (analyzing racial differences in dispute
resolution preferences).
317
See Sandra T. Azar & Corina L. Benjet, A Cognitive Perspective on Ethnicity, Race, and Termination of Parental
Rights, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249 (1994) (examining the potential for racial bias in how judges and mental health
professionals make parental rights determinations).
318
See Hope Lewis, Women (Under)Development: The relevance of “The Right to Development” to Poor Women of
Color in the United States, 18 LAW & POL’Y 281 (1996) (discussing how various forms of development may be
relevant to poor women of color, quite like it is to non-western people).
319
See Tim R. Sass & Stephen L. Mehay, The Voting Rights Act, District Elections, and the Success of Black
Candidates in Municipal Elections, 38 J.L. & ECON. 367 (1995) (analyzing the impact of district elections on the
electoral success of black city council candidates).
320
See John S. Heywood & James H. People, Deregulation and the Prevalence of Black Truck Drivers, 37 J.L. &
ECON. 133 (1994) (exploring the impact of trucking industry deregulation on black driver prevalence).
321
See Shawn D. Bushway & Anne Morrison Piehl, Judging Judicial Discretion: Legal Factors and Racial
Discrimination in Sentencing, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 733 (2001) (analyzing how judicial discretion impacts upon
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testimony,323 and prosecutorial discretion.324 They also explore criminal behavior,325 policing,326
sentencing,327 capital punishment,328 assessing truthfulness,329 and perceptions of the justice

racial disparities in sentencing); Roger E. Hartley, A Look at Race, Gender, and Experience, 8 JUDICATURE 4 191
(2001) (analyzing how race may impact time to judicial confirmation); Doris Marie Provine, Too Many Black Men:
The Sentencing Judge’s Dilemma, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 823 (1998) (analyzing how judges wrestle with the
dilemma of the mass incarceration of black men)
322
Mary R. Rose, The Peremptory Challenge Accused of Race or Gender Discrimination? Some Data From One
County, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 695 (1999) (analyzing how peremptory challenges in jury selection among the
defense and prosecution differentially, racially discriminate); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe Ellsworth, White Juror
Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y
& L. 201 (2001).
323
See Deborah Bartolomey, Cross-Racial Identification Testimony and What Not to Do About It: A Comment on
the Cross-Racial Jury Charge and Cross-Racial Expert Identification Testimony, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.247
(2001); James M. Doyle, Discounting the Error Costs: Cross-Racial False Alarms in the Culture of Contemporary
Criminal Justice, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 253 (2001); Heather B. Kleider & Stephen D. Goldinger,
Stereotyping Ricochet: Complex Effects of Racial Distinctiveness on Identification Accuracy, 25 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 65 (2001) (investigating how a black person’s presence effects recognition accuracy for surrounding
whites); Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Discrimination and Instructional Comprehension: Guided Discretion, Racial
Bias, and the Death penalty, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 337 (2000) (analyzing the lack of jury instruction
comprehension on discriminatory death sentencing);Siegfried Ludwig Sporer, Recognizing Faces of Other Ethnic
Groups: An Integration of Theories, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 36 (2001); Otto H. MacLin, M. Kimberly
MacLin, & Roy S. Malpass, Race, Arousal, Attention, Exposure, and Delay: An Examination of factors Moderating
Face Recognition, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 134 (2001); Otto H. MacLin & Roy S. Malpass, Racial
Categorization of Faces: The Ambiguous Race Face Effect, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 98 (2001); Christian A.
Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A MetAnalytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3 (2001); Steven M. Smith, R.C.L. Lindsay, Sean Pryke, & Jennifer
E. Dysart, Can False Identifications Be Diagnosed in the Cross-Race Situation?, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 153
(2001); Ludwig Sporer, The Cross-Race Effect: Beyond Recognition of Faces in the Laboratory, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 170 (2001); Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, The Other-Race Effect in Eyewitness Identification:
What Do We Do About It?, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 230 (2001); Daniel B. Wright, Catherine E. Boyd, & Colin
G. Tredoux, A Filed Study of Own-Race Bias in South Africa and England, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 119 (2001).
324
Lisa Frohmann, Convictability and Discordant Locales: Reproducing Race, Class, and Gender Ideologies in
Prosecutorial Decisionmaking, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 531 (1997) (analyzing how race is reproduced during
prosecutors’ discourse about sexual assault defendants’ convictability)
325
See R. Barry Ruback & Paula J. Vardaman, Decision Making in Delinquency Cases: The Role of Race and
Juveniles’ Admission/Denial of the Crime, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 47 (1997) (analyzing racial differences in
juvenile admission to crimes and how harshly admitters and deniers were treated); Eric Silver, Race, Neighborhood
Disadvantage, and Violence Among Persons with Mental Disorders: The Importance of Contextual Measurement,
24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 449 (2000) (analyzing whether race is a significant predictor of violence among the
mentally ill when accounting for neighborhood disadvantage)
326
See John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Race on Policing and Arrests, 44 J.L. & ECON. 367
(2001) (examining the relationship between the racial composition of a police force and racial patterns of arrest)
327
See Bushway & Piehl, supra note XX; David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing:
Evidence From the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285 (2001) (examining the racial impact of the Sentencing
reform Act of 1984)
328
See Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey, & Martin T. Wells, Forecasting Life and Death: Juror Race,
Religion, and Attitude Toward the Death Penalty, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (2001) (examining how race impacts
jurors’ decisions about capital sentencing)
329
See Charles L. Ruby & John C. Brigham, Can Criteria-Based Content Analysis Distinguish Between True and
False Statements of African American Speakers?, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 369 (1998) (attempting to generalize a
technique for assessing truthfulness to African Americans).
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system.330 Moreover, they explore issues such as affirmative action,331 law student career
outcomes,332 and law firm diversity.333 Between 2002 and 2006, the interdisciplinary social
science and law journals published thirty-nine social science, race and law or race and empirical
legal scholarship articles. These articles focus on discrimination,334 generally, unconscious
racism,335 intelligence testing,336 Brown v. Board’s legacy,337 affirmative action,338 and success
330

See Richard R. W. Brooks & Haekyung Jeon-Slaughter, Race, Income, and Perceptions of the U.S. Court System,
19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 249 (2001) (discussing African Americans’ perception of the courts across income levels);
Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in legal Authorities: What Do Majority and Minority Group Members
Want from law and Legal Institutions?, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215 (2001) (presenting a procedural justice based
model linking public confidence and trust to views about how legal authorities treat the public); Ronald Weitzer,
Racialized Policing: Residents’ Perceptions in Three Neighborhoods, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 129 (2000) (examining
individuals’ perceptions of racialized police tactics); Deane C. Wiley, Black and White Differences in the Perception
of Justice, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 649 (2001) (exploring racial differences in attitudes about the justice system); Scot
Wortley, John Hagan, & Ross Macmillan, Just Des(s)erts? The Racial Polarization of Perceptions of Criminal
Injustice, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 637 (1997) (examining how extensive media coverage of an interracial crime
influences public perception about the criminal justice system).
331
See Jean-Pierre Benoit, Color Blind Is Not Color Neutral: Testing Differences and Affirmative Action, 15 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 378 (1999) (arguing that color blind policies serve to undermine racial progress); Keith J. Bybee, The
Political Significance of Legal Authority: The Case of Affirmative Action, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 263 (2000)
(critiquing the Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence); Theodore Eisenberg, An Important Portrait of Affirmative
Action, 1 AM. L. & ECON REV. 471 (1999) (analyzing affirmative action in university admissions); Wendy M.
Williams, Perspectives on Intelligence Testing, Affirmative Action, and Educational Policy, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y
& L. 5 (2000); Douglas K. Detterman, Tests, Affirmative Action in University Admissions, and the American Way, 6
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 44 (2000); Howard T. Everson, A Principled Design Framework for College Admissions
Tests: An Affirming Research Agenda 6 112 (2000); Linda S. Gottfredson, Skills Gaps, not Tests, Make Racial
Proportionality Impossible, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 129 (2000); Diane F. Halpern, Validity, Fairness, and
Group Differences: Tough Questions for Selection Testing, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 56 (2000); Matthew H.
Scullin, Elizabeth Peters, Wendy M. Williams, & Stephen J. Ceci, Role of IQ and Education in Predicting Later
Labor Market Outcomes: Implications for Affirmative Action, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 63 (2000); Linda F.
Wightman, Role of Standardized Admission Tests in the Debate About Merit, Academic Standards, and Affirmative
Action, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 90 (2000); Robert Perloff & Fred B. Bryant, Identifying and Measuring
Diversity's Payoffs: Light at the End of the Affirmative Action Tunnel, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 101 (2000);
Cecil R. Reynolds, Why is Psychometric Research on Bias in Mental Testing So Often Ignored?, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 144 (2000).
332
See Richard O Lempert, David L. Chambers, & Terry K. Adams, Michigan’s Minority Graduates in Practice:
The River Runs Through Law School, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 395 (2000) (comparing minority and white law
school alumni on career outcomes).
333
See Elizabeth Chambliss & Christopher Ugen, Men and Women in Elite Law Firms: Reevaluating Kanter’s
Legacy, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 41 (2000) (exploring the effect of minority partner representation on minority
associate representation at elite law firms).
334
See Steven D. Levitt, Testing theories of Discrimination: Evidence From Weakest Link, 47 J.L. & ECON. 431
(2004) (analyzing game show participation to discern modes of discrimination).
335
See Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders,
28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 483 (2004) (analyzing the effect of unconscious racial stereotype priming on police
officers’ and probation officers’ attitudes about adolescent offenders)
336
See Philippe Rushton & Arthur R. Jensen, Thirty Years of Research on Race Differences in Cognitive Ability, 11
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 235 (2005); J. Pjilippe Rushton & Arthur R. Jensen, Wanted: More Race Realism, Less
Moralistic Fallacy, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 328 (2005); Robert J. Sternberg, There Are No Public-Policy
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in law school.339 They also focus on the judiciary340 and juries.341 In addition, these articles
address sentencing,342 capital sentencing,343 psychopathy,344 perceptions of justice and crime
control,345 and hate crimes.346 Lastly, they cover racial passing,347 politics,348 and tort awards.349

Implications: A Reply to Rushton and Jensen, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 295 (2005); Richard E. Nisbett,
Heredity, Environment, and Race Differences in IQ, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 311 (2005); Lisa Suzuki &
Joshua Aronson, The Cultural Malleability of Intelligence and Its Impact on the Racial/Ethnic Hierarchy, 11
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 320 (2005).
337
See Orley Ashenfeler, William J. Collins, & Albert Yoon, Equalizing the Role of Brown v. Board of Education in
School Equalization, Desegregation, and Income in African Americans, 8 AM. L. & ECON REV. 213 (2006); Richard
R. W. Brooks, Diversity and Discontent: The Relationship Between School Desegregation and Perceptions of Racial
Justice, 8 AM. L. & ECON REV. 410 (2006); Charles T. Clotfelter, Jacob V. Vigdor, & Helen F. Ladd, Federal
Oversight, Local Control, and the Specter of “Resegregation” in Southern Schools, 8 AM. L. & ECON REV. 347
(2006); Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Steven D. Levitt, The Black-White Test Score Gap Through Third Grade, 8 AM. L. &
ECON REV. 249 (2006); Thomas J. Kane, Stephanie K. Riegg, & Douglas O. Staiger, School Quality,
Neighborhoods, and Housing Prices, 8 AM. L. & ECON REV. 183 (2006); Alan Krueger, Jesse Rothstein, & Sarah
Turner, Race, Income, and College in 25 Years: Evaluating Justice O’Connor’s Conjecture, 8 AM. L. & ECON REV.
282 (2006); Douglas S. Massey, Social Background and Academic Performance Differentials: White and Minority
Students at Selective Colleges, 8 AM. L. & ECON REV. 390 (2006); Paul E. Sum, Steven Andrew Light, & Ronald F.
King, Race, Reform, and Desegregation in Mississippi Higher Education: Historically Black Institutions after
United States v. Fordice, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 403 (2004) (exploring racial integration at historically black
colleges and universities); Marta Tienda & Sunny Xinchun Niu, Capitalizing on Segregation, Pretending Neutrality:
College Admission and the Texas Top 10% Law, 8 AM. L. & ECON REV. 312 (2006).
338
See Richard A. Epstein, Of Same Sex Relationships and Affirmative Action: The Covert Libertarianism of the
United States Supreme Court, 12 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 75 (2004) (comparing judicial standards applied to cases
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Table 3. Race Scholarship in Interdisciplinary Social Science & Law Journals
1987-1991
1992-1996
1997-2001 2002-2006 Total
AM. L. & ECON REV.
0
1
0
9*
10
BEHAV. SCI. & L.
1
9*
3
0
13
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 0
0
0
1
1
J. LEGAL STUD.
0
1
1
5
7
J.L. & ECON.
0
2
2
1
5
J.L. ECON. & ORG.
0
0
0
1
1
JUDICATURE
2
0
2
1
5
JUST. SYS. J.
0
0
0
1
1
LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
1
6
6
7
20
LAW & POL’Y
3
1
0
0
4
LAW & SOC’Y REV.
2
1
5
3
11
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
0
0
3
2
5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 0
2
20*
7*
29
SUP. CT. ECON. REV.
0
0
0
1
1
9
23
42
39
113
TOTAL
Note: An asterisk denotes a period where more than one noted journal article was part of a
symposium.
The collective results of these analyses indicate several things: Despite some interest in
recent years, Critical Race Theory founders have not employed much social science or empirical
methods in their scholarship. Much of the research in this area has been conducted by non344
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critical race theorists. In fact, it also seems that most of this scholarship is produced by white law
faculty, though this is admittedly mere speculation. These faculty members are largely at nine of
the top twenty law schools. In particular, Ian Ayres and Richard Brooks at Yale, Linda Hamilton
Krieger at Boalt, and Gary Blasi and Jerry Kang at UCLA have published multiple articles in this
area. As such, the social science, race, and law scholarship as well as the race and empirical legal
scholarship of professors currently at these nine law schools has grown considerably in the past
five years.
When comparing law journals, much of this scholarship appears in the top general law
reviews as opposed to specialized race and law or civil rights journals. This could be due to the
hierarchical nature of legal academic publishing. Within these journals, there has been a
progression in the number of articles published with a significant up-tick in the past five years.
This is in part due to several symposia on social science, race and law issues during this period.
Thus, the symposia on affirmative action in law school admissions and book reviews of
Pervasive Prejudice and Crossroads, Directions, and a New Critical Race Theory in the
Stanford Law Review and the symposium on behavioral realism in the California Law Review
account for the drastic jump in the number of articles that intersect social science, race, and law
or explore race and law issues empirically over the past five-year period.
Despite the noticeable growth in social science, race, and law scholarship as well as race
and empirical legal scholarship published in law reviews, the real impact in this area is seen in
interdisciplinary social science and law journals. Three times as many articles have been
published in these journals when compared to law reviews and journals. Within interdisciplinary
journals there has been a steady progression in the number of articles published, particularly
during the past ten years. Psychology and law journals— Psychology, Public Policy & Law as
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well as Law and Human Behavior—have been the biggest outlets. The latter publishes articles
across multiple disciplines but is the official journal of Division 41, the American PsychologyLaw Society, of the American Psychological Association. This is partially accounted for by the
symposia in Psychology, Public Policy, & Law on race, juries, and eye-witness testimony as well
as one on race and intelligence testing.
The articles published by these academics and within these journals cover an array of
topics. Some of the more popular issues addressed include antidiscrimination law, Brown v.
Board of Education’s legacy, and affirmative action especially within the context of law school
admissions. What I term legal actors and participants—judges, juries, and eye witnesses—were
also well covered vis-à-vis other topics. Two fairly new topics also emerged. Law and economics
applied to race issues as well as unconscious racism as assessed by the Implicit Association Test
were two areas of growing interest.
2. An Integrative Model
As I noted, Critical Race Realism is a synthesis of Critical Race Theory, empirical social
science, and public policy. Such an integrative approach is nothing new. Charles Houston
employed social science in a litigation strategy as a means to legally end school segregation
which in turn had policy reverberations. Contemporarily, law professors have also demonstrated
growing interest in the intersection of race and social science. Thus, my contention is simply that
critical race theorists should employ empirical modes of understanding race and racism among
legal actors and within legal institutions and doctrine more often. Quite possibly, it should be the
dominant strand of critical race scholarship.
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Critical race theorists may argue any of the conventional points against engaging in
empirical research.350 Additionally, they may also make arguments, more particular to Critical
Race Theory, against synthesizing Critical Race Theory and empirical legal scholarship. First,
quite like their Critical Legal Studies predecessors, Critical Race Theory scholars insist that facts
are irrelevant, maybe even pretextual, to judicial decision outcomes.351 Employing statistical data
supports the idea that such data is neutral and objective. This is fundamentally antithetical to
Critical Race Theory doctrine. Second, privileging numbers undermines the power of narrative, a
central Critical Race Theory methodology.352
My attempt is not to cast aside one of the dominant strands of critical race scholarship—
narrative. I concur wholeheartedly with Richard Delgado’s analysis that,

[t]he stories of outgroups aim to subvert the ingroup reality. In civil rights, for example,
many in the majority hold that any inequality between blacks and whites is due either to
cultural lag, or inadequate enforcement of currently existing beneficial laws—both of
which are easily correctable. For many minority persons, the principal instrument of their
subordination is neither of these. Rather, it is the prevailing mindset by means of which
members of the dominant group justify the world as it is, that is, with whites on top and
browns and blacks on the bottom.
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Stories, parables, chronicles, and narratives are powerful means for destroying
mindset—the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared understandings
against a background of which legal and political discourse takes place.353

In a nutshell, narrative is a rich descriptive method. When engaged in, it may serve as a cathartic
tool for the narrator.354 It may also allow “the other” to gain a sense of perspective,355 maybe
even empathy.356
However, narrative has its share of weaknesses—ones that would be substantially
buttressed if employed in conjunction with empiricism. As noted by Daniel Farber and Suzanna
Sherry, there are concerns about the validity of narratives.357 This is likely to be particularly so
among those naïve about issues of race or those who are outright antagonists to the Critical Race
Theory agenda—racial progress. Farber and Sherry cite four validity concerns. The first is that
fictional narrative creates a “spurious aura of empirical authority.”358 The second deals with the
degree to which the narrative is truthful.359 Similarly, the third focuses on the difficulty of
actually discerning if truth is being spoken—a methodological issue.360 Finally, the fourth
concern is the degree to which the narrative account is representative of any population of
people.361
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Indeed it is quite possible to be both critical and empirical.362 Moreover, the benefits of
synthesizing Critical Race Theory with empirical legal scholarship are manifold! First, empirical
legal scholarship methods allow for theory development, empirical testing, and theory
refinement.363 Furthermore, employing empirical research methods leads to “fairly” objective
knowledge, which is “relatively” unfettered by personal prejudices.364 Additionally, empirical
methods have the “propensity to sharpen our focus on the normative questions that may be
concealed by factual complexity and by the willingness of [some] to avoid responsibility for
[their] value choices.”365 For example, though empirical research may impact powerful people’s
attitudes and actions, such individuals also have “defenses to ward off offensive or inconvenient
knowledge.”366 However, when an individual or an institution can no longer employ empirical
uncertainties to continue to engage in conscious or unconscious racist conduct, they must
ultimately state their normative preferences.367
Second, it has long been noted that empirical legal scholarship is of value to Critical Race
Theory. Derrick Bell noted that “empiricism is a crucial aspect of Racial Realism. By taking into
consideration the abysmal statistics regarding the social status of black Americans, their
oppression is validated.”368 As such, empirical legal scholarship can be a more useful tool in
highlighting racial disparities in the law’s application vis-à-vis traditional case analysis.369 As
such, it allows critical race theorists to reach out to individuals who are less willing to accept a
362
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central principle of Critical Race Theory —that people of color are subordinated in America.
This is done by revealing that although blatant racism may be significantly diminished in
America, unconscious racism exists and still adversely impacts the lives of African Americans
and other people of color.370 As Karl Llewellyn noted, “[W]e need improved machinery for
making the facts about such effects – or about needs and conditions to be affected by a decision –
available to the courts.”371 Empirical social science is just such machinery.
With these factors in mind, an empirical analysis of race and law issues has some general
yet substantive benefits. These benefits are evinced whether empirical methodology is employed
alone or in conjunction with the narrative approach. Furthermore, these benefits speak directly to
the concerns raised by Farber and Sherry. First, empiricism bolsters claims made by theory or
personal narrative. Second, empiricism provides a method to determine how true a theory or
narrative is. This may be less so in determining how accurate an individual’s personal account of
racism is, but it speaks to Farber and Sherry’s final validity concern. Empiricism allows one to
test the degree to which theory or a personal account of reality is true for others. Where it is
generalizable, especially for a vast number of similarly situated individuals, public policy may be
implicated.372
Thus, the third benefit of synthesizing empirical legal scholarship and Critical Race
Theory should be concerned with, what Robert Summers described as pragmatic
instrumentalism—a means-end relationship to law.373 Legal scholarship, more readily than any
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other type of research, has the potential to shape public policy.374 In this vein, the benefit of
Critical Race Theory’s employment of social science is that social science may help shape
courts’, legislatures’, and administrative agencies’ policy decisions.375 Policy goals, and the best
methods for pursuing them, necessitate data about the “policies and about empirical assumptions
underlying the policies and about the likely effect of various routes for achieving them.”376
Social science can provide those data.377 As such, law must be seen as both a response to social
needs and as having an impact on social issues.378 Charles Houston’s efforts at Howard Law
School, to create a “laboratory for civil rights and a nursery for civil rights lawyers,”379
demonstrates an effort to create such policy-changers—social engineers. Both practicing
attorneys380 and law professors381 have demonstrated a long history of serving as such social
engineers. Thus, legal policy may be shaped by a number of actors, involve substantive or
procedural law, and relate to public or private law.382 The legal scholar, legal policymaker, or
practicing lawyer may shape public policy.383 A legal academic may employ social science
through his research,384 by providing a more systematic approach to understanding the role of
race within the legal system. A legal policy-maker may employ social science in two ways either
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procedurally or substantively.385 Procedurally, she may employ social science to get the
legislature or courts to function in a more racially fair manner. Substantively, the policy-maker
may employ social science to look at the underlying racial-fairness of a rule of law. A practicing
lawyer may employ social science by introducing it into evidence to advance certain arguments
in a case.386
Ultimately, the challenge to the broader goal of using social science to shape public
policy with regards to race may not be whether it would be effective but where it would be most
effective. For example, judges may not be well-suited to understand the significance of the social
science evidence.387 Courts are not well-equipped to respond to changes in the social science
literature. Social science evidence, once accepted as persuasive by courts, becomes precedent.
Such precedent becomes difficult to alter when additional research alters the conclusions of
previous social science.388 Compared to courts, however, legislatures can adapt to changes in
social science quicker.389 Legislatures can also act without there being a live controversy before
them.390
3. Creating a Critical Race Realism
A number of legal actors could be deemed critical race realists. However, law professors
may be in the best position to actually formulate a Critical Race Realism agenda. This is largely
because they can actually produce Critical Race Realism scholarship. What is problematic is that
their training likely makes them ineffective empirical legal scholars. First, law schools are not
particularly good at teaching its students, some of whom go on to be law professors, how to
385
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systematically “find, interpret, prove, and rebut” facts.391 Second, social scientists are taught to
subject their hypotheses to “every conceivable test and data source,” in attempt to disconfirm the
theory.392 However, lawyer attempts to marshal all possible evidence in support of her
hypothesis and “distract attention” from any possible contradictory information.393 A critical race
realist should utilize the best of both of these approaches. Third, legal scholars largely do their
academic work isolated from their social science counterparts and suffer from such a failure to
dialogue.394 Fourth, law professors, unlike their social scientist counterparts, do not have a stable
group of graduate students trained in empirical methodology and statistical analysis.395 Thus,
legal academics are likely at a handicap in developing an empirical agenda.
Thus, to develop a Critical Race Realism, law schools might consider offering not only
courses in empirical legal scholarship 396 but also empirical legal scholarship courses focused on
Critical Race Theory topics.397 Critical race theorists may also take any of three steps to advance
Critical Race Realism. First, they might retool.398 Several universities offer programs to train
faculty in empirical research methodology. For example, the University of Michigan, through its
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) Summer Program in
Quantitative Methods, offers courses in basic and advanced quantitative analysis.399 Harvard
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University, through its Institute for Quantitative Social Science, offers a variety of degree and
training programs, conferences, and seminars and workshops.400 Northwestern recently offered
an Empirical Scholarship Workshop.401 Second, Critical Race theorists could also collaborate
with social scientists in other departments402 or the growing number of social scientist law
professors.403 An additional source of collaboration could be social science graduate students
interested in the intersection of race and law issues. Critical Race theorists might also actively
recruit graduate students engaged in social science, race, and law scholarship to law school. Such
an approach would possibly add to the pool of minority law students and provide law professors
with a research assistant, trained in research methodology, for three years. Finally, Critical Race
theorists could simply import social science and empirical scholarship into their own work.
CONCLUSION
Critical Race Theory was founded as “a race-based, systematic critique of legal reasoning
and legal institutions….”404 It has been critiqued, however, as struggling to define its substantive
mission, methodological commitments, and connection to the world outside of academia.405 This
article attempts to provide a specific methodology that is consistent with Critical Race Theory’s
overarching mission and that has both applied and academic components. Empirical social
science is this methodology which should ultimately 1) expose racism where it may be found, 2)
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identify its effects on individuals and institutions, and 3) put forth a concerted attack against it, in
part, via public policy arguments. I call this concept as Critical Race Realism.
Critical Race Realism is drawn from a long and rich intellectual history. This history
started with the growth of interdisciplinarity in American legal education and traversed its way
through intellectual movements at Columbia, Yale, Chicago, and Wisconsin law schools. The
recent explosion in empirical legal scholarship and the New Legal Realism Project provide
contemporary efforts with which Critical Race Realism must square itself. Ultimately, the
intersection of social science, race, and law or race and empirical legal scholarship is not a new
nexus. The efforts of Charles Hamilton Houston in ending school segregation point to this fact.
Furthermore, there has been growing interest in these areas within recent years. However, given
this history and contemporary movement, I advocate that Critical Race Theory incorporate more
empirical social science. I do not think that there is an incompatibility between being critical and
being empirical. Furthermore, I do not think that such an approach need supplant Critical Race
Theory’s narrative approach. I do, however, think empirical social science can greatly enhance
critical race theorists’ arguments and advance Critical Race Theory’s goals. Thus, I hope critical
race theorists take steps to indeed make Critical Race Theory more systematic.
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